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ABSTRACT
The year 2020 marked the 150th anniversary of the ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment, the last of the three Reconstruction Amendments
that fundamentally transformed both the structure of the Constitution and
the nature of American federalism. The Fifteenth Amendment differed
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from its predecessors in a number of important ways. First, it was the only
one of the Reconstruction Amendments and remains the only part of the
entire Constitution to focus explicitly on race. In addition, the amendment
became the first provision of the Constitution to limit the power of the
state governments to establish the qualifications for voters in elections for
state office, providing that “[t]he right of citizens . . . to vote shall not be
denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude”1 and vesting Congress with the authority to enforce this
command by adopting “appropriate legislation.”2 Thus, among other
things, the Fifteenth Amendment provided the most plausible source of
congressional authority for the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965—
a statute which was and continues to be, by any standard, one of the most
important civil rights measures that Congress ever adopted.
Nonetheless, unlike the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, legal
scholars have shown relatively little interest in exploring the background
of the Fifteenth Amendment. This Article describes both the sequence of
events that led to the passage and ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment
and the forces that shaped the amendment itself.
INTRODUCTION
For more than 50 years, the Supreme Court has relied primarily on the
Fourteenth Amendment in providing constitutional protection for voting
rights. Beginning with the decisions in Reynolds v. Sims3 and Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections,4 the Court has consistently held that the
right to vote is fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis and
that any state action that infringes upon that right is unconstitutional unless
the action is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest.
Thus, for example, in the recent decision in Alabama Legislative Black
Caucus v. Alabama,5 the majority relied on the Equal Protection Clause in
concluding that strict scrutiny should be applied whenever a court finds
that race was the predominant factor in determining the boundaries of even
a single legislative district.

Copyright 2022, by EARL MALTZ.
 I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Travis Crum, who read an
earlier draft of this Article and provided a variety of useful suggestions.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
2. Id. § 2.
3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
4. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
5. Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254 (2015).
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The framers of the Reconstruction Amendments would have found
this approach to be puzzling at best. The Republicans who were
responsible for drafting the Fourteenth Amendment made a conscious
decision to delete protection for voting rights from the text of the
amendment6 and during the congressional debates explicitly stated that the
amendment would not impose any new limitations on state control of the
electoral process.7 Instead, it was not until after the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified that congressional Republicans united around the
Fifteenth Amendment, which they viewed as the source of constitutional
protection for voting rights.
This Article will describe the complicated dynamic that ultimately led
to the passage and ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment.8 The Article
will begin by discussing the role that the issue of African-American
suffrage played in the debates over Reconstruction policy in 1866 and the
considerations that shaped the decision to remove explicit protections for
the right to vote from the Fourteenth Amendment. The Article will then
describe the conflict over the issue within the Republican party in the
period between 1866 and 1869, which culminated in the creation of a
consensus among Republicans regarding the need for either a federal
statute or a constitutional amendment that would require states to allow
African-Americans to vote. At the same time, however, Republicans

6. See BENJAMIN KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF
FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 101 (1914).
7. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
8. WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF
THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1969) is the only modern book-length treatment of
the evolution and ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. However, Gillette
makes only passing reference to the discussions of the issue of African-American
suffrage that took place during the crafting of the Fourteenth Amendment and also
pays little attention to the debate over women’s suffrage during the late 1860s.
Other, less detailed discussions of the background of the Fifteenth Amendment
include MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL
REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1869, at 325–38 (1974); ERIC
FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
REMADE THE CONSTITUTION 93–125 (2019); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT
TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 75–
82 (2009); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS,
1863-1869, at ch. 9 (1990); XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK
SUFFRAGE AND NORTHERN REPUBLICANS, 1860-1910, at ch. 1 (1997) and Travis
Crum, The Superfluous Fourteenth Amendment, 114 NW. U.L. REV. 1549, 1592–
1617 (2020).
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continued to have widely differing views on the precise form that federal
action should take.
Delving deeply into the complex congressional debates that produced
the final draft of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Article will describe these
differences, focusing, among other things, on the unsuccessful efforts to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex as well as race, as well as the
equally unsuccessful attempt to ban only discrimination against AfricanAmericans, which would have left the states free to explicitly deny the
right to vote to Asian-Americans and other racial minorities on the basis
of race. After chronicling the brief but intense struggle over ratification,
the Article will conclude by describing the impact that the Fifteenth
Amendment has had on the electoral process in the United States.
I. THE DISPUTE OVER AFRICAN-AMERICAN SUFFRAGE IN THE EARLY
RECONSTRUCTION ERA
The passage of the Fifteenth Amendment was the culmination of one
of the major political struggles of the early Reconstruction era. By the end
of the Civil War, most mainstream Republicans had embraced the idea that
African-Americans should be allowed access to the right to vote under the
same conditions as their white counterparts. Republican support for the
basic concept of African-American suffrage was based in part on
ideological convictions that transcended purely sectional considerations.
Thus, for example, in 1864 a majority of congressional Republicans
supported an unsuccessful effort to enfranchise African-Americans in the
territory of Montana,9 and in early January 1866, the Republican
dominated House of Representatives passed a bill extending the right to
vote to African-Americans in the District of Columbia.10 However, the
primary impetus for broader federal action was created largely by the need
to deal with fundamental issues related to Reconstruction.
The issue of political power was at the core of the debate over
Reconstruction policy. In simple terms, Republicans believed that the exConfederate states should not be restored to their former status as full
partners in the Union without some assurance that the governments of
those states would be in the hands of forces that were loyal to the federal
government.11 The difficulty was that the vast majority of the white
population in the states that had seceded had been Confederate
9. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1361, 1651 (1864).
10. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (1866).
11. See, e.g., CARL SCHURZ, REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE SOUTH (1865),
https://wwnorton.com/college/history/america9/brief/docs/Schurz_Carl_Report_
on_the_Condition_of_the_South_1865.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BV9-BXPG].
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sympathizers, whom most Republicans believed could not be trusted with
control of the institutions of state and local government.
Republicans were also gravely concerned about the potential impact
of the restoration of the ex-Confederate states on the balance of power in
the federal government. Even before the war, Republicans had argued that
the policies adopted by the federal government had too often been
designed to protect the interests of Southern slaveowners. In particular,
Republicans had complained bitterly that the formula for determining
representation in the House of Representatives, which included threefifths of the number of slaves in each state in the basis of representation,
had given an unfair advantage to the South.12
Ironically, the Thirteenth Amendment, which was the capstone of the
long struggle against the institution of slavery itself, also had the potential
to further enhance the political influence of what Republicans described
as the “slave power.”13 Once freed from bondage, under the rules
established by the original Constitution, all former slaves would be
counted fully in determining the number of representatives to which the
states in which they lived were entitled in the House of Representatives.
But at the same time, unless the rules that had been in place in the exConfederate states prior to the war were changed, only the white citizens
would have a voice in choosing the congressional delegations in those
states. Thus, the influence of these citizens—most of whom had been
Confederate sympathizers—would actually be greater than it had been
prior to the Civil War. Moreover, the vast majority of those who were
chosen to represent the ex-Confederate states under this regime would
have almost certainly aligned themselves with Northern Democrats,
making it far more difficult for Republicans to keep control of the House
of Representatives. For obvious reasons, this prospect was anathema to
most, if not all, mainstream Republicans.
Many Republicans believed that these problems could be ameliorated
by enfranchising the newly-freed slaves. In addition to supporting the
concept of race-blind suffrage as a matter of principle, these Republicans
reasoned that the ex-slaves would be likely to support Republican
candidates and would thus provide a political counterweight to
Confederate sympathizers in elections for both state office and the House
12. See, e.g., Letter from John Quincy Adams to Uriah Tracy (1804), in
Digital History, UNIV. HOUS., http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook
.cfm?smtID=3&psid=215 [https://perma.cc/Q4HZ-NSXU] (last visited June 19,
2021).
13. For a detailed discussion of the concept of the slave power, see LEONARD
RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER: THE FREE NORTH AND SOUTHERN DOMINATION,
1780-1860 (2000).
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of Representatives. Further, some Republicans argued that if AfricanAmericans were given the means to protect themselves through the state
political process, the need for additional federal action designed to provide
such protection might be obviated. Thus, for example, in December 1865,
one Republican newspaper predicted that even “‘conservative’
[Republicans] . . . will be willing that some general Constitutional
amendment shall be adopted, looking to an equalization of suffrage
everywhere, without regard to color.”14
However, in 1866 some Republicans did not share the belief that
federal action designed to enfranchise African-Americans was either
appropriate or desirable. One problem was ideological. During the early
Reconstruction period, many moderate and conservative Republicans
remained committed to the concept of federalism and believed that any
measure that established national standards for voting would unduly
impinge on the prerogatives of individual state governments. For example,
on January 5, 1866, in his annual address to the state legislature, Samuel
Cony, the Republican Governor of Maine, observed that “the states of the
American Union are not under the surveillance of the general government
. . . except in a very limited degree, and the regulation of the right of
suffrage rests with [the states] exclusively.”15
In addition, not all Republicans were convinced that, if granted the
right to vote, the newly-freed slaves would in fact effectively counter the
voting power of white Southerners. For example, arguing against the
imposition of a constitutional mandate for race-blind suffrage, the
conservative New York Times observed:
Everybody knows how easy it is for a wealthy and intelligent
class, though small in numbers, to hold in subjection a poor and
ignorant majority, even when the rights of the individual and his
equality before the law are loudly proclaimed and speciously
enforced. The whole history of Southern politics exhibits this.16
Finally, moderate Republicans in particular also recognized that the
idea of making African-American suffrage a centerpiece of the party’s
reconstruction program carried substantial political risk. Although most
Republicans favored African-American suffrage, in a number of Northern
states crucial swing voters were adamantly opposed to the concept. As a
14. Admission of Rebel States, BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER (Me.), Dec.
11, 1865, at 2.
15. The Governor’s Address, BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER (Me.), Jan.
5, 1866, at 3.
16. The Suffrage Question, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1866, at 4.
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result, during the fall of 1865, supporters of African-American suffrage
suffered a number of important defeats in local elections in Northern
states.17 The most significant setback came in Connecticut, the last New
England state to deny African-Americans the right to vote, where a
measure that would have removed the racial qualification was defeated in
a referendum conducted in October 1865.18 Thus, it appeared that the
aggressive promotion of African-American suffrage had the potential to
undermine the political fortunes of the Republican party in jurisdictions
where the electorate was closely divided between Republicans and
Democrats. Against this background, one Republican senator worried
privately that “if I vote for a negro suffrage bill . . . the opposition journals
will open their guns on me, and if possible make me and my party
unpopular.”19 The impact of these considerations was clearly reflected in
the treatment of the issue of African-American suffrage during the process
of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. African-American Suffrage and the Drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment as we know it emerged only after a long
and complex drafting process. The ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment in December 1865 had permanently abolished slavery.
Nonetheless, when the first session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress convened
in the same month, most congressional Republicans believed that
additional changes in the Constitution were necessary to adequately
address issues related to Reconstruction. Initially, however, they did not
envision the creation of the kind of multifaceted amendment that
ultimately became part of the Constitution. Instead, they focused their
attention on the creation of amendments that were more narrowly tailored
to deal with specific problems.
The Republican members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction20
quickly took the lead in drafting these amendments. Congress created this
17. JOSEPH JAMES, THE DRAFTING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 16–17
(1956).
18. Id. at 17.
19. Notes from the Capitol, CONGREGATIONALIST, Jan. 12, 1866, at 6.
20. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction was composed of twelve
Republicans—Sens. William Pitt Fessenden of Maine, James W. Grimes of Iowa
Ira Harris of New York, Jacob M. Howard of Michigan and George H. Williams
of Oregon and Reps. John A. Bingham of Oho, Henry T. Blow of Missouri,
George S. Boutwell of Massachusetts, Roscoe Conkling of New York, Justin S.
Morrill of Vermont, Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania and Elihu B. Washburne
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committee in December 1865 with a mandate to “inquire into the condition
of the [ex-Confederate] [s]tates . . . and report whether they, or any of
them, are entitled to be represented in . . . Congress.”21 Soon after they first
convened, committee members focused their attention on the problem of
determining the proper allocation of political power in a reconstructed
Union.
On January 15, 1866, the committee considered a proposal that would
have barred the states from making “any distinction . . . in political . . .
rights or privileges, on account of race, creed, or color.”22 However, all of
the Republican members of the committee except Republican Sens.
William Pitt Fessenden of Maine and Jacob M. Howard of Michigan
rejected this proposal.23 Instead, the committee Republicans, joined by
Democratic Sen. Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, coalesced around the idea
of a constitutional amendment that would not have interfered directly with
state control over voter qualifications, but instead would have reduced the
number of seats in the House of Representatives allocated to states that
prohibited African-Americans from voting.24
When this proposed amendment reached the floor of the House of
Representatives, radical Republicans such as George W. Julian of Indiana,
Thomas D. Eliot of Massachusetts, and Frederick A. Pike of Maine
contended that the measure was fatally flawed because it would have
allowed states to continue the practice of restricting the right to vote to
white people.25 They contended that the governments of states with large
populations of free African-Americans were constitutionally required to
enfranchise the erstwhile slaves by Article IV, section 4, which requires
states to maintain a “republican” form of government, and insisted that the
Constitution already vested Congress with authority to enforce this
mandate.26 Republican Rep. William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania would
have found the same authority in the congressional power to regulate the
“time, place and manner” of elections to the House.27 Some Republicans
who took this view also contended that the joint committee proposal might
in fact be counterproductive because it implicitly recognized the authority
of Illinois—and three Democrats—Sen. Reverdy Johnson of Maryland and Reps.
Henry Grider of Kentucky and Andrew J. Rogers of New Jersey.
21. KENDRICK, supra note 6, at 38.
22. Id. at 50.
23. Id. at 51–52.
24. Id. at 52.
25. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 56–58 (Julian), 406–07 (Eliot),
407 (Pike) (by implication) (1866).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 408–09.
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of the states to indirectly disenfranchise African-Americans through the
use of devices such as property and literacy qualifications for voting.28 For
these reasons, they argued that Congress should propose a constitutional
amendment that would explicitly bar racial discrimination in suffrage
qualifications.29
Republican Rep. Roscoe Conkling of New York, the floor manager of
the joint committee proposal, responded by recapitulating the arguments
against such a constitutional amendment. He contended that the radical
proposal
trenches upon the principle of existing local sovereignty. It denies
to the people of the several States the right to regulate their own
affairs in their own way. It takes away a right which has been
always supposed to inhere in the States and transfers it to the
General Government.30
In addition, noting that most Northern states did not allow AfricanAmericans to vote and that “some of them have repeatedly and lately
pronounced against it,” Conkling observed that many state legislatures
would almost certainly refuse to ratify a constitutional amendment that
banned racial discrimination in voting rights.31 Most of Conkling’s
Republican colleagues were convinced by these arguments, and, with only
minor modifications, the joint committee proposal passed the House with
the requisite two-thirds majority on January 31, 1866.32
The obstacles to the passage of the committee measure proved to be
greater in the Senate. There, the Republicans who favored an amendment
that would have explicitly prohibited the states from limiting access to the
ballot on the basis of race quickly took a prominent role in the debates.
Republican Sen. Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, well-known for his
advocacy of extreme radical positions, took the lead in attacking the
proposal that had been passed by the House of Representatives. In a
lengthy speech that, depending on one’s perspective, might be described
as either erudite or pretentious, Sumner reviewed not only American
constitutional history but also French and classical precedents as well.33
Insisting that the right to vote was a natural right,34 Sumner argued that
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

E.g., id. at 407, 426.
E.g., id. at app. 57.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 673–87.
Id. at 677.
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both the Guarantee Clause and Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
had already vested Congress with the authority to ban such discrimination
by statute.35 Despite these contentions, Sumner pressed for the adoption of
a constitutional amendment that would have provided “that there shall be
no Oligarchy, Aristocracy, Caste or Monopoly invested with peculiar
privileges and powers, and there shall be no denial of rights, civil or
political on account of color or race anywhere within the United States.”36
Predictably, Sumner used the occasion to attack the white power
structure in the ex-Confederate states. But he was equally unsparing in his
assault on the proposal being considered by the Senate. Describing the
joint committee proposal as “nothing else than another Compromise of
Human Rights”37 and declaring that “a moral principle cannot be
compromised,”38 Sumner declared that the proposal reported by the joint
committee would “admit in the Constitution the twin idea of Inequality in
Rights”39 and, comparing the supporters of the proposal to Pontius Pilate,
declared that they would be “partak[ing] in the wrong.”40
Although they phrased their alternatives to the committee formulation
in simpler language and were less openly contemptuous than Sumner of
their more moderate colleagues, a number of other Republican senators
were equally committed to the passage of a constitutional amendment that
would directly outlaw racial discrimination in voting rights. Thus, for
example, Republican Sen. John B. Henderson of Missouri asserted:
Every consideration of peace demands it. It must be done to pluck
out political disease from the body-politic, and restore the
elementary principles of our Government; it must be done to
preserve peace in the States and harmony in our Federal system;
it must be done to assure the happiness and prosperity of the
Southern people themselves; it must be done to establish in our
institutions the principles of universal justice; it must be done to
secure the strongest possible guarantees against future wars.41
Most Republicans, however, continued to support the measure that
had passed the House. Although William Pitt Fessenden had voted for a
35. Id. at 683, 687.
36. Id. at 674.
37. Id. at 673.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 674.
41. Id. at app. 125; see also id. at 736–42 (statement of Sen. Henry Lane),
831–35 (statement of Sen. Daniel Clark), 915 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard),
app. 98–105 (statement of Sen. Richard Yates).
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proposal much like Henderson’s during the deliberations of the committee
itself, both he and fellow Republican committee member George H.
Williams of Oregon now suggested that the newly freed slaves were in fact
not yet ready to be trusted with the right to vote. Fessenden asserted:
I take it no one [including Sumner] contends . . . that now at this
time the whole mass of the population of the recent slave States is
fit to be admitted to the exercise of the right of suffrage. I presume
no man who looks at the question dispassionately and calmly
could contend that the great mass of those who were recently
slaves . . . and who have been kept in ignorance all their lives,
oppressed, more or less forbidden to acquire information, are fit
at this day to exercise the right of suffrage, or could be trusted to
do it, unless under such good advice as those better able might be
prepared to give them.42
Similarly, Williams pleaded:
[G]ive these men a little time, give them a chance to learn that
they are free, give them a chance to acquire some knowledge of
their rights as freemen; give them a chance to learn that they are
independent and can act for themselves; give them a chance to
divest themselves of that feeling of entire dependence for
subsistence and the sustenance of their families upon the land
holders of the South to which they have been so long
accustomed . . . and I will go with [Sumner and Henderson] to
give them the right of suffrage.43
However, the supporters of the joint committee formulation continued
to rely primarily on the argument that proposals to directly ban racial
discrimination in voting qualifications had no chance of being ratified.
Fessenden in particular made no effort to disguise his disdain for Sumner’s
insistence that Republicans maintain ideological purity at all costs,
declaring:
I do not think it my duty as a legislator in [the Senate] to trouble
myself much about what are called abstractions. My constituents
did not send me here to philosophize. They sent me here to act, to
find out, if I could, what is best for the good of the whole, and to
do it, and they are not so short-sighted as to resolve that if they

42. Id. at 704.
43. Id. at app. 95.
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cannot do what they would, therefore they will do nothing.44
Fessenden also observed:
The argument that addressed itself to the committee was, what can
we accomplish? What can pass? If we report [an AfricanAmerican suffrage amendment] is there the slightest possibility
that it will be adopted by the States and become a part of the
Constitution of the United States? It is perfectly evident that there
could be no hope of that description.45
Most Republicans agreed with this assessment of the political
situation. On a number of different occasions, the Senate voted on
language such as that which was proposed by Sumner and Henderson, but
none of these proposals received the votes of more than ten Republican
senators.46 However, at this stage in the process, Fessenden and his allies
were also unsuccessful in obtaining the support necessary to pass a
constitutional amendment that would have changed the basis of
representation. While the measure proposed by the joint committee
received a slim majority in the Senate when the roll call vote was taken on
March 9, 1866, Sumner and four other radicals joined a group of
conservative Republicans and the united Democrats to deny supporters of
the measure the two-thirds majority necessary for passage.47
However, the political situation changed dramatically on March 27,
when President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The
terms in which the veto message was couched made it clear that Johnson
and the mainstream Republicans would never be able to come to an
agreement on the conditions under which the ex-Confederate states would
be allowed to regain their status as full partners in the Union.48 Thus, it
became almost certain that the issue of reconstruction would dominate the
upcoming elections in the fall of 1866 and that Republicans would need a
coherent plan for reconstruction to present to the voters.
44. Id. at 705.
45. Id. at 704.
46. Id. at 1284, 1287, 1288.
47. Id. at 1289. The debates over the committee proposal are described in
detail in Earl M. Maltz, The Forgotten Provision of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Section 2 and the Evolution of American Democracy, 76 LA. L. REV. 149, 153–
68 (2015).
48. BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 164; ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 250–52 (1988) [hereinafter
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION]; ERIC MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND
RECONSTRUCTION 326 (1960).
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Such a plan had been devised by Republican activist Robert Dale
Owen of Indiana. The Owen plan included both a five-part constitutional
amendment and a bill that would have provided that once the amendment
had become part of the Constitution, any of the ex-Confederate states that
ratified the amendment would be entitled to regain its status as a full
partner in the Union. Among other things, the Owen amendment would
have outlawed racial distinctions in qualifications for voters after July 4,
1876, and in the interim would have excluded those who were denied the
right to vote on racial grounds from the calculations used to determine
representation in the House of Representatives.49
All of the provisions of the Owen plan were initially approved by the
joint committee over the unanimous opposition of committee Democrats
on April 21. The eight Republicans who were present for the initial
committee vote were almost united in support of these sections. Among
Republicans, the only dissenter was Rep. George S. Boutwell of
Massachusetts, who consistently supported immediate imposition of a
race-blind suffrage requirement.50
However, as details of the Owen plan became publicly known, it
became clear that many mainstream Republicans continued to oppose the
idea of providing direct constitutional protection of the right of AfricanAmericans to vote. Thus, for example, the Cleveland Daily Herald
reported that many Republicans had concluded that “the attempt to force
negro suffrage upon the States by Congressional action must . . . be
abandoned.”51 Similarly, the New York congressional delegation
produced a reconstruction plan that notably omitted any reference to a
requirement of race-blind suffrage but was similar to the Owen proposal
in all other relevant respects. A correspondent of the New York Times
observed, “The question of a negro-suffrage condition, either immediate
or remote, was received with very little favor.”52
Faced with this reality, the joint committee did an about-face on the
suffrage issue. On April 25, Republican Sen. George H. Williams of
Oregon moved that the committee reconsider its decision to submit the
Owen amendment to the full House of Representatives and the Senate, and
the motion was passed over the dissents of Jacob Howard of Michigan and
49. KENDRICK, supra note 6, at 83–84.
50. Id. at 86.
51. The Reconstruction Question, DAILY CLEVELAND HERALD, Apr. 27,
1866, at 2, https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=NCNP&u=lln_alsu&id=GALE|GT300
5197827&v=2.1&it=r&sid=NCNP&asid=492d5b97 [https://perma.cc/ZD9M49VE].
52. Action of the New-York Delegation on Reconstruction, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 1866, at 1.
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Republican Rep. Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania.53 Three days later,
only Howard and Republican Rep. Elihu B. Washburne of Illinois
demurred when Stevens moved to have the prohibition on racial
qualifications for voting removed from the proposed constitutional
amendment.54 Instead, the only suffrage-related proposals in the five-part
amendment that was ultimately reported were section two, which provided
that, with certain exceptions, the number of representatives to which a state
was entitled in the House of Representatives would be reduced if the state
refused to extend the right to vote to some groups of adult males, and
section three, which disenfranchised those who had supported the
rebellion.55
Despite the deletion of the explicit prohibition on racially
discriminatory qualifications for voters, opponents of the proposed
Fourteenth Amendment argued that section one of the proposal, which
prohibited states from “abridg[ing] the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States” or “deny[ing] to any person . . . the equal protection
of the laws,” would have the same effect as the deleted provision.56
Republicans, however, denied this claim. Thus, speaking in the capacity
of official representative of the joint committee itself, Jacob Howard
insisted that “[t]he right of suffrage is not . . . one of the privileges or
immunities . . . secured by the Constitution” and thus that section one
“does not give . . . the right of voting [to anyone].”57 Against this
background, the requisite majorities in both houses of Congress58 passed
the five-part committee proposal and sent it to the states for ratification.
B. The Debate over African-American Suffrage, 1866-1868
The debate over the Fourteenth Amendment was the centerpiece of the
political campaign that led up to the election of 1866. During the
campaign, Republicans argued that the proposed amendment should
provide the basis for reconstruction, and generally indicated that any of
the ex-Confederate states that ratified the amendment would be entitled to
be reinstated to the Union. Based on this platform, Republicans won an

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

KENDRICK, supra note 6, at 100.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 116.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2397, 2538 (1866).
Id. at 2766.
Id. at 3042, 3149.
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overwhelming victory in the election, gaining two-thirds majorities in both
houses of Congress.59
Emboldened by this triumph, Republicans moved more aggressively
against racial discrimination in voting rights during the lame-duck session
of the 39th Congress that convened following the election. Both houses of
Congress quickly passed a bill enfranchising African-Americans in the
District of Columbia,60 and on January 8, 1868, overrode President
Andrew Johnson’s veto of the measure.61 In addition, the Senate agreed to
a measure previously passed by the House of Representatives that
enfranchised African-Americans in the territories controlled by the federal
government,62 and both houses passed a bill that required the Nebraska
legislature to accept a prohibition on racial discrimination in voting rights
as a “fundamental condition” of having statehood granted to the territory.63
However, once again it was the need to deal with the problem of
reconstruction that prompted the most significant action on the suffrage
issue. By 1867, the hopes of those Republicans who believed that the
Fourteenth Amendment alone could provide the basis for a final settlement
of the issue of reconstruction had been dashed by subsequent events.
Despite the defeat of the supporters of Andrew Johnson in the election of
1866, with the exception of Tennessee, the governments of the exConfederate states had refused to ratify the amendment. As a result, even
the most moderate mainstream Republicans had no choice but to concede
the necessity of adopting additional reconstruction measures in the lameduck session of the 39th Congress that convened in early 1867.64 The
Military Reconstruction Act that emerged from that session required,
among other things, that as a prerequisite for resumption of full status in
the Union, the constitutions of the unreconstructed states be rewritten to
enshrine the principle of universal manhood suffrage in state law.65
The decision to force color-blind suffrage on the South by federal
action created both a philosophical and a political dilemma for many
Republicans. Despite the ambiguous position of the former members of
59. See, e.g., BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 188–209; FONER, RECONSTRUCTION,
supra note 48, at 264–71.
60. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 109, 138 (1867).
61. Id. at 313–14, 344.
62. Id. at 382–99.
63. Id. at 481–87.
64. BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 212.
65. For descriptions of the complex dynamic that ultimately produced the
Military Reconstruction Act, see, for example, BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 210–
43; FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 48, at 271–91; and MCKITRICK, supra
note 48, at 473–85.
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the Confederacy, most Americans were accustomed to viewing those
states as members of the Union. Indeed, the claim that the ex-Confederate
states had never lost this status had been the foundation of the political
theory upon which the Union effort in the Civil War had been based. Thus,
the passage of the Military Reconstruction Act left Republicans open to
the charge that they were asserting an authority that might be used to
control the electoral process even in states that had never purported to
secede.
Initially, some Republicans believed that the emergence of a national
consensus on the issue of African-American suffrage might resolve the
problem. Their hopes were fed by a suggestion by the Chicago Times—a
Democratic organ—that the opposition party should accept and embrace
the inevitability of impartial suffrage.66 It soon became clear, however,
that most Democrats did not share the sentiments expressed by the Times
and that failure to effectively address the seeming inconsistencies in the
Republican position on African-American suffrage could have adverse
political consequences.
These problems were particularly acute for Republicans in the exConfederate states—a region in which the party hoped to develop and
maintain substantial political power. White Southern Democrats could
claim that their region was being singled out for unduly oppressive federal
action and could also contend that the absence of African-American
suffrage requirements in the North demonstrated that Republicans were
not in fact actually concerned about the welfare of the freedmen but were
instead simply using the former slaves as pawns to further Republican
political goals. Both of these claims provided effective ammunition for
assaults on Republican organizing efforts in the South.67
Republicans made a variety of familiar arguments in an effort to blunt
the force of these attacks. First, they emphasized the fact that, in
constitutional terms, the position of the ex-Confederate states could still
be conceptualized as different from that of their Northern counterparts.
From this perspective, federal power to regulate suffrage in the South
might conceivably be justified by reference to the war power—a rationale
that would not be available with respect to federal action requiring the
Northern states to allow African-Americans to vote.68 In addition,
Republicans constantly stressed the need to create a class of AfricanAmerican voters that would provide a counterweight to the political power
66. MCKITRICK, supra note 48, at 463.
67. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1372 (1867) (statement of Sen. John
Henderson); Equal Suffrage, HARPER’S WKLY., Apr. 27, 1867, at 258.
68. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1365 (1867) (statement of
Sen. Jacob Howard).
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of rebellious whites, a need that obviously did not exist in the states that
had adhered to the Union cause.69 Finally, Republicans argued that the
social and legal climate in the erstwhile slave states placed AfricanAmericans at particular risk, and that granting the freedmen the ballot was
the best and least intrusive means of protecting them from the predations
of their former masters.70
In addition to relying upon the special circumstances that they claimed
justified federal action on African-American suffrage in the South,
Republicans also responded more directly to the charge of hypocrisy by
redoubling their efforts to have African-Americans enfranchised in the
North through the process of state constitutional reform, and in 1867,
Republican-controlled state legislatures succeeded in having the issue
placed on the ballot for fall elections in Kansas, Minnesota, and Ohio.
However, reform on a state-by-state basis was by its nature a gradual,
drawn-out process and in any event could not resolve the federal
constitutional issues that were raised by the suffrage provision of the
Reconstruction Act. Thus, for many Republicans, the idea of taking federal
action that would require states to allow African-Americans to vote
throughout the nation became increasingly attractive.
Radical Republicans continued to press for a statute that would outlaw
racial discrimination in suffrage throughout the nation. With the
Fourteenth Amendment not yet ratified, radicals reiterated their contention
that Congress could derive the requisite authority to pass such a statute
from either the Guarantee Clause or the enforcement provision of the
Thirteenth Amendment. The most persistent and vociferous supporters of
this view were Sens. Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson, both of whom
sponsored national impartial suffrage bills that were introduced during the
first session of the 40th Congress.71
However, many mainstream Republicans did not share the broad
conception of federal power that underlaid the Sumner and Wilson
proposals. The counterargument of Republican Sen. Lyman Trumbull of
Illinois was among those that received the widest circulation. While noting
his support for the basic principle of impartial suffrage and state
constitutional amendments embodying this principle, Trumbull averred
that “even to do a right thing in a wrong way is often fraught with greater
danger than to leave the thing undone, and is never justifiable when there
is a right way by which it may be accomplished.”72 He warned against
69. See, e.g., Kentucky Politics, CINCINNATI COM., Apr. 27, 1867, at 2.
70. The Last Veto, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE (Phila.), Mar. 25, 1867, at 2.
71. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 292, 345 (1867).
72. THE SUFFRAGE QUESTION: Can Congress Regulate Suffrage in the
States—Views of Hon. Lyman Trumbull, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1867, at 2.
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constitutional theories that granted Congress unlimited discretion,
asserting that “to allow [Congress] to exercise powers not granted would
be to make [the legislators] the masters instead of the servants of the
people, and such a representative Government would be little better than
a despotism.”73 Turning specifically to the Guarantee Clause, Trumbull
declared that permitting Congress to control voter qualifications in the
loyal states would be “a sacrifice of the obvious meaning and spirit of [the
Constitution]”74 and that the adoption of a statute requiring states to allow
African-Americans to vote “would be the subversion instead of the
guarantee of republican forms of government, and would necessarily
abrogate all existing State Governments.”75
Against this background, the key test of support for a suffrage bill
during the first session of the 40th Congress came on July 12, 1867. On
that date, in apparent contravention of a previous resolution limiting the
business of the session to matters related to Reconstruction, Sumner
attempted to bring his suffrage bill to the Senate floor for consideration.
However, on the question of whether his motion was in order, Sumner was
able to garner the support of only twelve of his Republican colleagues, as
fifteen Republicans joined seven Democrats in opposition.76
The refusal of conservative and moderate Republicans to countenance
federal suffrage legislation should not be taken as evidence that they
opposed a national guarantee of impartial suffrage in principle. Indeed, by
mid-1867, a consensus favoring such a guarantee seems to have emerged
among mainstream Republican leaders of all stripes. The crucial
difference was that, unlike more radical Republicans who generally
believed that the guarantee could be provided by statute, their more
conservative and moderate compatriots believed that a constitutional
amendment was necessary. While the supporters of this approach
understood that such an amendment would constitute an unprecedented
federal intervention into the affairs of state government, the nature of that
encroachment would be limited by its terms and would not imply that the
scope of federal power should be interpreted broadly in other contexts.
Thus, African-Americans could be provided with access to the ballot while
leaving the traditional distribution of power between the state and federal
governments otherwise undisturbed.
With these considerations no doubt in mind, even before the passage
of the Reconstruction Act of 1867, important moderate journals such as

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 615 (1867).
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the Springfield Republican and the Chicago Tribune expressed the view
that the adoption of a suffrage amendment would provide a simple, final
solution to the problem of reconstruction more generally.77 The
subsequent imposition of universal suffrage on the ex-Confederate states
provided further impetus to the movement for such an amendment. For
example, the Republican asserted that for the northern states to demand
universal suffrage as a precondition for readmission while not recognizing
the right of African-Americans to vote in their own states was
“contemptible.”78 Similarly, in the same editorial in which it attacked the
attempt to pass a national suffrage bill, the New York Times declared that
it was necessary to “strengthen [the principle of impartial suffrage] with
constitutional forms so that no single State shall have the power to disturb
it.”79
Seeking to give these sentiments more concrete form, on March 7,
1867, John Henderson reintroduced his proposal for a constitutional
amendment prohibiting racial discrimination in voting rights.80 Perhaps
because Congress was preoccupied with the adoption of more general
reconstruction measures, no real effort was made to press for the adoption
of the Henderson amendment during the short sessions of March and July
1867. Initially, the prospects for passage of the amendment during the long
session scheduled to begin in early 1868 seemed to be brighter. However,
in the interim, the elections of 1867 intervened and dramatically changed
the political dynamic.
These elections did not involve the selection of national officials.
Rather, voters were being called upon to choose the officers who would
serve at the state and local levels. Nonetheless, the elections were also in
part seen as a referendum on issues of national policy. African-American
suffrage was one such issue. While voters were being asked to approve
measures that would have allowed African-Americans to vote in several
different states, the state of Ohio was generally considered to be the most
important barometer of sentiment on this issue. For example, the
Cincinnati Commercial averred that, in that state, “if the [impartial
suffrage] amendment does not prevail, the Republican party will be

77. No More Floundering, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN, Jan. 1, 1867, at 2;
Universal Suffrage, CHICAGO TRIB., Feb. 17, 1867, at 2.
78. How the South Should Look at it, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN, Mar. 13,
1867, at 4.
79. Universal Suffrage—Congress and the States, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1867,
at 4.
80. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1867).
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substantially defeated” even if party members were able to claim all other
state offices.81
When the votes were tallied, it became clear that Republicans had
suffered a stunning defeat. The suffrage amendment in Ohio not only
received less than 46 percent of the votes that were cast, but also proved
to be a formidable drag on Republican candidates, as the party lost control
of the state legislature and barely retained the governorship. The news for
Republicans was no better elsewhere, as the efforts to give AfricanAmericans access to the ballot box were also defeated in both Kansas and
Minnesota, and the party lost ground in virtually every state in which
elections were contested, including California, New York, and
Pennsylvania.82
The potential implications of this debacle went well beyond the
diminution of Republican power in the states that had held local elections
in 1867. The national elections of 1868 were fast approaching, and
Republicans were well-aware that African-American suffrage might be a
key issue in that election. Against this background, the responses of the
different elements of the party to their defeat in 1867 varied widely.
Radical Republicans blamed the defeat on the moderate wing of the
party and continued to argue that Congress should immediately act on
impartial suffrage legislation.83 Yet despite their defiant rhetoric, radicals
were clearly disheartened by the results of the 1867 elections. Thus, even
the normally indefatigable Charles Sumner was forced to recognize that
“times haven’t been propitious” for African-American suffrage
legislation.84
Nonetheless, in March 1868, Republican Rep. John H. Broomall of
Pennsylvania brought just such a bill to the floor of the House of
Representatives for debate.85 In expressing his opposition, Republican
Rep. Rufus P. Spalding of Ohio not only condemned the measure as
unconstitutional but also declared that passage of such a bill would be “the
death-knell of our hopes . . . in the approaching presidential canvass.”86
Similarly, the Republican predicted that the enactment of a national
suffrage law would “give [almost] every state in the Union to the
81. The Constitutional Amendment, CINCINNATI COM., Sept. 18, 1867, at 4.
To the same effect, see Suffrage for Women, NAT’L ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD,
Oct. 5, 1867, at 3.
82. BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 272.
83. See, e.g., The Thirty-Fourth National Anti-Slavery Subscription Anniversary,
NAT’L ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, Jan. 18, 1868, at 2.
84. Washington Letter, CINCINNATI COM., Jan. 1, 1868, at 2.
85. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1955 (1867).
86. Id. at 1971.
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Democrats.”87 With sentiment so strongly against it, the Broomall bill
never even came to a vote, and by March 19 it was reported that no
Republican had “the slightest idea” that any such measure would be voted
on, let alone adopted, during that session of Congress.88
The defeat in Ohio also severely weakened the moderate/conservative
drive for a constitutional amendment dealing with suffrage. Some
moderate Republicans remained committed to the passage of such an
amendment. For example, The Republican argued that “the Republican
party must stand for equal suffrage, or confess that it has no basis at all on
which it can stand”89 and contended that, given the course that the process
of reconstruction had already taken, “[t]here is really only one thing to be
done now, and that is to propose the establishment of equal suffrage in the
Constitution.”90 However, the Commercial disagreed, asserting that the
election of 1867 had settled the point and that Republicans should not
press the suffrage issue in the upcoming campaign.91 It was reported that
some mainstream Republicans were even willing to abandon the
requirement that the ex-Confederate states guarantee impartial suffrage as
a condition for readmission.92
Given these circumstances, the local elections that were held in the
spring of 1868 took on special significance. In March, a smashing
Republican success in New Hampshire gave the pro-suffrage element of
the party a major boost. However, the hopes of this group of Republicans
were dashed by the results of the April election in Connecticut, which were
inconclusive, and by those in Michigan, where the inclusion of an AfricanAmerican suffrage provision led to the rejection of a proposed new state
constitution. As the New York Times noted, the results of these elections
demonstrated that the Republican party “has no strength to throw away,
and that it has good reason for behaving itself just as well as it can.”93 The
Commercial concurred, reiterating its position that “the Party cannot risk
success this fall by a conspicuous recognition of the doctrine . . . of negro
suffrage in the North.”94 Even the Republican was forced to retreat,
conceding bitterly that the Connecticut and Michigan results
87. Untitled, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN, Oct. 15, 1867, at 2.
88. From Washington, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN, Mar. 19, 1868, at 2.
89. Untitled, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN, Oct. 14, 1867, at 2.
90. Party Issues for 1868, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN, Jan. 3, 1868, at 2.
91. The Democratic Platform of the Eighth of January, CINCINNATI COM.,
Jan. 10, 1868, at 4.
92. Untitled, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN, Oct. 12, 1867, at 4.
93. The Spring Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1868, at 4.
94. The Republican National Convention, CINCINNATI COM., May 14, 1868,
at 4.

416

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

[i]ndicate beyond a doubt that the rank and file of the republican
party . . . are yet so far from being unanimous in favor of black
suffrage, that the more immediate interests of reconstruction
might be jeopardized by forcing the issue at this juncture, and it is
therefore certain that the party leaders and party press will only be
too ready to ignore or postpone it.95
The Republicans who wished to downplay the issue of AfricanAmerican suffrage dominated proceedings when the party convention
assembled to choose a presidential candidate in Chicago on May 19 and
20. By the time that the convention opened, the presidential ambitions of
Benjamin Wade and Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase—both of whom were
prominently associated with the radical pro-suffrage position—had
evaporated. Instead, the nomination of Ulysses S. Grant, the favorite of the
conservative and moderate wings of the party, was a foregone
conclusion.96 Wade was also shunted aside for the vice presidency in favor
of Schulyer Colfax of Indiana, the less ideologically committed Speaker
of the House.97 Finally, although radicals continued to demand that the
party irrevocably bind itself to the pursuit of impartial suffrage,98 the
convention deliberately evaded that key issue. While supporting the power
of Congress to require universal suffrage in the ex-Confederate states, the
party platform also declared that “the question of suffrage in all the loyal
States properly belongs to the people of those States.”99
Although the adoption of this provision of the platform infuriated
many radicals, in fact the action of the convention had aptly captured the
mood of a majority of Republicans. For example, although expressing
regret that the party could not bring the country to accept the concept of
impartial suffrage, the Republican nonetheless concluded that “since it has
been distinctly proved that it cannot, there is no reason why it should go
so far ahead as to lose the nation in a vain effort to achieve an impossible
good.”100 Thus, while leaving the way open for individual Republican
candidates to express support for the idea of taking federal action to
95. Untitled, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN, Apr. 9, 1868, at 2.
96. MARTIN MANTELL, JOHNSON, GRANT AND THE POLITICS OF
RECONSTRUCTION 69–70 (1973).
97. Id. at 98–99.
98. The Republican Party—Suffrage, NAT’L ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD,
May 9, 1868, at 2.
99. 1 DONALD JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 38 (1978).
100. Our Platform, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN, May 23, 1868, at 4; see also
The Political Situation, CINCINNATI COM., May 23, 1868, at 4; The Platform and
the Nominations, NATION, May 28, 1868, at 425.
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enfranchise African-Americans, the platform sought to dispel the notion
that the party as an institution was committed to the idea that such action
was necessary.
However, this effort was hampered by a number of different factors.
First, the platform plank could not erase the memory of the forceful
position on the issue that the party’s candidates had taken only a year
before. In addition, the platform language failed to deal effectively with
the tension between the party’s refusal to endorse a nationwide suffrage
measure and its insistence that the ex-Confederate states enfranchise their
African-American populations as a precondition to readmission. This
tension was only exacerbated in the period between the convention and the
election when, over the objection of some moderate representatives and
senators, provisions requiring the maintenance of universal suffrage were
included as “fundamental conditions” in the bills that restored seven
different southern states to full participation in the Union.101
The debate over fundamental conditions highlighted the constitutional
issues involved in federal regulation of access to the ballot. In addition,
the debate provided the Democrats with a new weapon that they could use
in the presidential campaign. After an extremely contentious convention
and a dalliance with the idea of selecting Chase as their candidate on a
platform that endorsed impartial suffrage, the Democrats ultimately chose
Horatio Seymour of New York to be their standard bearer and Francis A.
Blair, Jr. of Missouri to be his running mate. Although the party platform
did not explicitly take the position that African-Americans should not be
allowed to vote, the platform did declare that “any attempt by congress, on
any pretext whatever, to deprive any State of [the right to regulate access
to the ballot], or interfere with its exercise, is a flagrant usurpation of
power, which can find no warrant in the Constitution.”102
During the presidential campaign that followed, Republicans
generally tried to avoid the suffrage issue altogether. By contrast,
Democrats focused on the issue from a variety of different perspectives.
Reminding voters of the positions that the Republican party had taken in
the 1867 elections, Democrats sought to portray the Republicans as the
champion of voting rights for African-Americans103 and described the
Republican platform plank on this issue as a “cowardly . . . evasive

101. The debate surrounding the imposition of fundamental conditions is
described in BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 315–22.
102. Democratic Party Platform of 1868, in JOHNSON, supra note 99, at 38.
103. Speech of Daniel Voorhees, CINCINNATI COM., June 13, 1868, at 1;
Speech of John Reid, CINCINNATI COM., June 20, 1868, at 2; Speech of Allan
Thurman, CINCINNATI COM., July 20, 1868, at 2–3.
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dodge”104 which covered the true Republican position with “the thin veil
of expediency.”105
Building on the same theme, the Philadelphia Age urged voters to
dismiss the disclaimers in the platform for two reasons. First, the Age
reminded voters that during the 1866 campaign Republicans had promised
not to impose African-American suffrage on the Southern states and had
promptly broken that promise immediately after returning to office.106
Second, the Age asserted that the imposition of fundamental conditions on
the readmitted states demonstrated that the platform plank was a
“humbug.”107 Taking the same idea further, Democrats suggested that the
plank showed a more general Republican propensity for political
hypocrisy and cowardice.108
But despite Democratic efforts to exploit the suffrage question and
other issues, Grant’s personal popularity and the Republican pledge to
bring a speedy end to reconstruction proved too much for the Democrats
to overcome in the election of 1868. Republicans swept to victory in the
presidential election, and despite losing twenty seats in the House of
Representatives, also maintained a substantial majority in both houses of
Congress. This victory provided the backdrop for a renewed struggle over
African-American suffrage in the lame-duck session of the 40th Congress
that convened in early 1869.
II. THE DRAFTING OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Aftermath of the Election
Within weeks of the election, representatives of a variety of different
viewpoints within the Republican party renewed the call for a
constitutional amendment that would finally settle the suffrage issue.109
Several factors influenced the reinvigoration of the drive for such an
amendment. First, the election itself had reduced the political problems
attendant to the aggressive pursuit of African-American suffrage. No
matter what the public reaction, the presidency would be in Republican
104. Speech of Michael Kerr, CINCINNATI COM., June 13, 1868, at 1.
105. Speech of A. K. Bradley, CINCINNATI COM., July 22, 1868, at 2.
106. Not Twice, PHILA. AGE, May 23, 1868, at 2.
107. Arkansas, PHILA. AGE, June 3, 1868, at 2.
108. Speech of George Pendleton, PHILA. AGE, Aug. 1, 1868, at 2.
109. Some Considerations Why Impartial Suffrage Should be Made Universal,
CINCINNATI COM., Nov. 9, 1868, at 4; Amending the Constitution, HARPER’S
WKLY., Nov. 28, 1868, at 754; Our Washington Correspondence, NAT’L ANTISLAVERY STD., Nov. 14, 1868, at 3.
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hands for four years and both the House of Representatives and the Senate
would be safely Republican for at least two years. Of course, advocacy of
race-blind suffrage could still hurt the party in state and local elections,
but that problem would always remain. Thus, the political dangers
surrounding the issue were at their nadir in early 1869.
In addition, despite their victory, the election of 1868 had engendered
within Republican ranks a sense that the lame-duck session of the 40th
Congress might be the last opportunity to pass a suffrage amendment.
During that session, mainstream elements of the party would have a clear
two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress. Indeed, Republican
strength had been enhanced with the arrival of senators and representatives
from a number of newly readmitted Southern states. At the same time,
although the situation was not entirely clear, some Republicans feared that
the necessary two-thirds majority might be lacking in the House of
Representatives in the 41st Congress that was to convene in March
1869.110 Others expressed the concern that the party might soon lose
control of some state legislatures whose concurrence would be necessary
for ratification of any proposal for a constitutional amendment that might
emerge from Congress.111
In short, the elections of 1868 provided the Republican party with its
best opportunity to resolve the tension that had been inherent in its position
on the issue of African-American suffrage since early 1867. On one hand,
Republicans insisted that the ex-Confederate states allow the newly freed
slaves to vote as a precondition for readmission to the Union. But on the
other hand, despite being in firm control of Congress, Republicans had
failed to adopt any measure that would impose a similar mandate on the
states that had adhered to the Union.
There can be little doubt that Republicans felt this apparent dissonance
acutely. As already noted, the situation made Southern Republicans
particularly uncomfortable. For example, Republican Sen. Frederick A.
Sawyer from the recently reconstructed state of Tennessee complained that
“[we] have for two years been subject to the charge . . . that the Republican
party of the northern States put the negro on one platform in the loyal
States and upon another platform in the lately disloyal States.”112 But the
sources of Republican dissatisfaction went beyond simple sectional
discontent. For example, Rep. James G. Blaine later recalled that

110. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1629 (1869); Now Is the Time, NAT’L
ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, Nov. 28, 1868, at 1.
111. Now Is the Time, supra note 109, at 1; The Constitutional Amendment, N.
AM. & U.S. GAZETTE (Phila.), Feb. 6, 1869, at 2.
112. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1628 (1868).
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Republicans believed that it was “obviously unfair and unmanly”113 to
impose impartial suffrage on the South without requiring similar action
from the North and that most party members “became heartily ashamed of
[the platform position on the suffrage issue] long before the political
canvas had closed.”114 Thus, Blaine observed that there was a “desire and
a common purpose among Republicans to correct the unfortunate position
in which the party had been placed by the National Convention” and take
action on a suffrage measure that would have nationwide applicability.115
Similarly, during the debate over the Fifteenth Amendment, Republican
Sen. James W. Nye observed that “[although] [a]ll of my education and
my sympathies are with [the Northern] States . . . they are not strong
enough to make me desire any rule of conduct or any privilege for them
that is not granted to the southern states” and that “[m]y desire in the
passage of the [constitutional amendment is] to secure uniformity, to stop
this bickering about one law for one locality and another law for
another.”116
Other considerations also influenced the near-unanimous belief
among congressional Republicans that such a measure should be adopted
in 1869. Examining the words and deeds of mainstream Republicans in
the period from 1866 through 1868, one cannot help but conclude that
most party members agreed with the sentiments expressed by Republican
Sen. Edmund G. Ross of Kansas, who declared in 1869 that “[t]he first
great and sufficient reason why the negro should be admitted to the right
of suffrage in all the States is that it is right.”117 Admittedly, during this
period many party leaders had at times felt compelled to mute their support
for impartial suffrage for reasons of political expediency. But when
political conditions permitted, Republican advocacy of color-blind voting
had been consistent and forceful. Indeed, Republicans had sometimes
supported the cause of African-American suffrage even when that support
carried with it substantial political dangers.118
By proceeding through the medium of a federal constitutional
amendment, Republicans could avoid the problems that in a number of
113. JAMES BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS: FROM LINCOLN TO
GARFIELD WITH A REVIEW OF THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE POLITICAL
REVOLUTION OF 1860, at 412 (1884).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1306 (1869).
117. Id. at 983.
118. LaWanda Cox and John Cox, Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics:
The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography, 33 J.S. HIST. 303
(1967).
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cases had thwarted their efforts to enfranchise African-Americans on a
state-by-state basis. While the individual states would still have to ratify
any amendment, the ratification process would not require that
Republicans triumph in the kind of popular referenda that had often
rejected state constitutional amendments designed to provide AfricanAmericans with access to the ballot. Instead, a proposed federal
amendment would need to attract only the support of state legislatures—
bodies in which Republicans had great success in gaining majority support
for race-blind suffrage.
But states that had not yet enfranchised African-Americans in 1869
were not the only Republican concern. Many Republicans also doubted
the security of the political rights of the former slaves in the exConfederate states, notwithstanding the mandate that those states provide
for African-American suffrage in their state constitutions. Thus, for
example, even before the elections of 1868, The Nation had presciently
expressed the fear that after the southern states were restored to their preCivil War status, whites would seize control of the state governments and
disenfranchise African-Americans.119 While the imposition of
fundamental conditions was designed to obviate this danger, many
Republicans had doubts regarding the enforceability of these conditions.
The events of late 1868 had done little to ease Republican concerns on
this score. In Louisiana, attempts by African-Americans to vote for
Republican candidates had been met with violence and intimidation, while
in Georgia, the state legislature had refused to seat duly elected AfricanAmericans. Incidents such as these fueled the apprehensions of
Republicans who saw the need for a continuing federal commitment to
protect the voting rights of the freedmen.120
In addition, some Republicans saw the potential for long-term political
gains in the loyal states from a federal requirement that African-Americans
be granted the right to vote. Their calculations on this issue were obviously
complicated, for the elections of 1867 had clearly demonstrated the
unpopularity of the concept of African-American suffrage with a critical
portion of the electorate. Thus, for example, the Philadelphia North
American observed that vigorous advocacy of such an amendment would
bring with it the loss of some white votes.121

119. The Platform and the Nomination, NATION, May 28, 1868, at 425.
120. The Platform and the Nomination, NATION, Jan. 28, 1869, at 124; A
Constitutional Amendment, NAT’L ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, Oct. 17, 1868, at
1; Georgia and Its Colored Legislators, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1868, at 4.
121. Passage of the Suffrage Amendment, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE (Phila.),
Feb. 1, 1869, at 2.
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But throughout the two-year debate over the question, other prosuffrage Republicans contended that newly enfranchised AfricanAmericans would vote for party candidates in sufficient numbers to offset
any loss of white support. In the loyal former slave states of Kentucky,
Delaware, and Maryland, votes from large numbers of freedmen were
regarded as the best hope for overcoming the power of the state
Democratic parties. Although in the free states the number of potential
new votes was much smaller, Republicans also needed far fewer additional
votes to gain firm control of those state governments. Thus, some argued
that a constitutional amendment mandating race-blind suffrage would
have a salutary effect on Republican fortunes in those states as well. 122
Finally, by dealing conclusively with African-American suffrage,
Republicans hoped to remove two volatile issues from the national
political debate. The first of these was the issue of race itself. Ever since
the formation of the Republican party, Democrats had attempted to use
that issue to appeal to a racist white populace. Republicans hoped that by
irrevocably granting African-Americans the right to vote, they could
finally put the issue of race behind them. Thus, for example, Republican
Sen. Oliver H. P. T. Morton of Indiana declared:
The Democratic party for more than twenty years has lived upon
the negro question. It has been its daily food, and if the negro
question shall now be withdrawn from politics the Democracy, as
a party, will literally starve to death. [The adoption of an AfricanAmerican suffrage amendment] will forever withdraw the subject
from politics, and will strike down that prejudice to which the
Democratic party has appealed for years.123
Republicans also viewed the adoption of a constitutional amendment
granting African-Americans the right to vote as a means to put the issue
of reconstruction behind them. The Republican slogan in 1868 had been
“let us have peace,” 124 and Republican Sen. William M. Stewart of Nevada
asserted, “Let [impartial suffrage] be made the immutable law of the land;
let it be fixed; and then we shall have peace. Until then there is no
peace.”125 Stewart later observed that in 1869 many Republicans believed
that an irrevocable federal guarantee of enfranchisement would “save [the
ex-slaves] from peon laws and [allow them to] obtain powerful friends
122. GILLETTE, supra note 8, argues that this perception provided the primary
impetus for Republican advocacy of an African-American suffrage amendment.
123. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 991 (1869).
124. Let Us Have Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1868, at 4.
125. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 668 (1869).
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who would prevent [their] reenslavement” and thereby avoid the need for
a permanent federal presence to protect the freedmen in the exConfederate states.126 Similarly, Republican Rep. George Boutwell of
Massachusetts predicted that a constitutional amendment guaranteeing
African-Americans the right to vote would be “the last . . . of [the] great
measures growing out of the rebellion, and necessary for the
reorganization and pacification of the country.”127
In short, by the time that the lame-duck session of the 40th Congress
convened on December 7, 1868, virtually all mainstream Republicans
believed that the federal government should take some action that would
require the states to allow African-Americans to vote. However, they did
not agree on the precise form that the action should take.
B. The Congressional Debate
Initially, the proposed constitutional amendments that were reported
to the floors of the House and the Senate by their respective judiciary
committees were very similar. In both cases, the language of the proposal
mandated that the right to vote shall not be “denied or abridged” on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The major
difference was that, in an apparent effort to deal with situations such as
that of Georgia, the Senate version would also have prohibited the same
kinds of discrimination with respect to the right to hold office.128 During
the initial consideration of the Senate proposal on January 23, Stewart
observed that “I do not think that it will involve long discussion.”129
However, this prediction proved to be wildly optimistic. The amendment
was not finally approved by Congress until February 26,130 and only after
a long, complicated series of debates that featured, among other things, an
all-night session of the Senate on February 8.
In part, the length of the deliberations reflected the need for
mainstream Republicans to deal with the objections raised by Democrats
and their allies. Not surprisingly, Democratic complaints were at times
couched in openly racist terms. For example, describing AfricanAmericans as morally and intellectually inferior to whites, Democratic
Sen. Thomas T. Hendricks of Indiana asserted, “I do not believe that the
negro race and the white race can mingle in the exercise of political power
126. WILLIAM STEWART, REMINISCENCES OF SENATOR WILLIAM M. STEWART
OF NEVADA 232 (1908).
127. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 555 (1869).
128. Id. at 286, 668.
129. Id. at 541.
130. Id. at 1641.
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and bring good results to society.”131 In addition, Democrats sometimes
sought to characterize the effort to amend the Constitution as nothing more
than a cynical attempt to gain political advantage, with Democratic Sen.
James A. Bayard of Delaware declaring that “[t]he intent is, and the sole
intent [of the amendment is] to maintain the dominance of the
[Republican] party by . . . degradation of the suffrage.”132
However, opponents of the proposed amendment more often cited
other reasons for objecting to the Republican initiative. Opponents
frequently raised issues of federalism. Thus, contending that the
amendment would undermine the position of the states within the federal
structure, Sen. James Dixon of Connecticut—a former Republican who by
1869 had joined the Democrats—declared that “it is utterly impossible that
any state should be an independent republic which does not entirely
control its own laws with regard to the right of suffrage.”133 Building on
the same theme, Democrats at times argued that the amendment process
could not be used to limit state authority over suffrage, with Thomas
Hendricks contending that “the power of amendment is limited to the
correction of defects in the practical operations of the Government; but the
power of amendment does not carry with it the power to destroy one form
of government and establish another”134 and that the proposed amendment
would “take away from the States a power which they retained and which
is necessary to that independence and sovereignty of the States which the
original compact contemplated they should enjoy.”135
But perhaps the most common Democratic complaint was that the
effort to mandate African-American suffrage by federal law was
inconsistent with the terms of the party platform on which the Republicans
had stood during the election of 1868, and thereby broke an implicit
commitment made in that platform. Democrats contended that, in the
words of Democratic Rep. Charles A. Eldridge of Wisconsin, “if it be
possible that the Republican party can commit itself to anything . . . by its
action in national convention, [the party] committed solemnly to the
doctrine that the people of the several States have properly the right to
control the question of suffrage in their respective States.”136 Eldridge
declared that “the Republican members [of Congress] cannot force this

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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Id. at 1303–04.
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measure upon the country at this time without covering their party with . . .
dishonor, without a shameful violation of party pledges and party faith.”137
Democrats also argued that the declaration in the Republican platform
should be an important factor in establishing the ratification procedure for
any suffrage amendment that might be proposed. They reasoned that
voters had chosen the existing state legislatures with the understanding
that no such amendment would be put forward by Congress, and that if
voters who were opposed to African-American suffrage had been aware
that the issue would be presented to the legislature, they might well have
chosen to vote for different candidates. Given this problem, Democrats
insisted that any amendment should provide that ratification would be
accomplished either through the medium of state conventions or by
legislatures selected after the amendment was proposed by Congress.138
Republicans struggled to provide a convincing answer to the claim that
the effort to require the states to allow African-Americans to vote was
inconsistent with the position that the party had taken during the recently
concluded election campaign. One response came from Jacob Howard,
who insisted that the statement in the party platform was nothing more
than a recognition of the existing state of affairs and did not in any way
foreclose the possibility of pressing for a constitutional amendment that
would limit the power of the states to regulate access to suffrage.139
In any event, this debate was largely academic. As already noted,
during the third session of the 40th Congress, mainstream Republicans
were uniformly committed to the principle that African-Americans should
be allowed to vote. Moreover, they possessed the majorities necessary to
pass a constitutional amendment establishing that proposition in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate. The only remaining question
was whether they could agree on the precise form of the action that should
be taken.
1. The Rejection of Statutory Change
Some radical Republicans continued to press for the passage of a
statute instead of or in addition to a constitutional amendment. In the
House of Representatives, George Boutwell argued that Congress should
both pass an impartial suffrage statute and approve a constitutional
amendment,140 while in the Senate, Charles Sumner was the most
prominent advocate of the position that Congress should pass only a
137.
138.
139.
140.
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See, e.g., id. at 673 (statement of Sen. Thomas Hendricks).
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statute.141 Radicals cited a number of different considerations in arguing
for statutory change.
First, supporters of a suffrage statute noted the complexity of the
process necessary to produce constitutional change. They observed that
while a statute could become effective immediately upon passage by
Congress and approval by the President, a constitutional amendment
would have to await “the uncertain concurrence of state legislatures.”142
Thus, at best the effective date of any such amendment would be
postponed, and at worst the amendment might never receive the necessary
support from state legislatures at all.
In addition, Sumner and other radical Republicans expressed concerns
founded in constitutional theory. They feared that by resorting only to a
constitutional amendment, Congress would be implicitly conceding that,
in the absence of such an amendment, the federal government lacked
authority to regulate elections for state offices. This position was anathema
to some radicals; indeed, Sumner was so fearful of this possibility that he
opposed the passage of any constitutional amendment designed to
enfranchise African-Americans. He also suggested that a struggle over
ratification in the states would allow the Democratic party to use the issue
“as the pudding-stick with which to stir the bubbling mass.”143 By contrast,
Boutwell, like most radicals, believed that Congress should adopt a
constitutional amendment in addition to a statute focusing on the suffrage
issue.
In offering their proposal, advocates of the suffrage statute faced the
perennial problem of identifying the source of congressional power to
address the issue. Sumner took the most extreme ground, reiterating his
oft-repeated assertions that “anything for Human Rights is
constitutional”144 and that “there can be no State Rights against Human
Rights.”145 More temperate radicals relied on their standard claims related
to the scope of the guaranty of a republican form of government in Article
IV146 and the enforcement clauses of both the Thirteenth147 and Fourteenth
Amendments.148

141. Id.
142. Id. at 504; see also id. at 561, 1001.
143. Id. at 904.
144. Id. at 902 (emphasis in original).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 721 (statement of Rep. William Kelley).
147. Id. at 1004 (statement of Sen. Richard Yates).
148. Id. at 558–59 (statement of Rep. George Boutwell), 1000 (statement of
Sen. George Edmunds).
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But despite their best efforts, the radical Republicans found relatively
little support for their broad conception of federal power. Their arguments
were rejected not only by Democrats, but also by a variety of mainstream
Republicans, including Sens. Jacob M. Howard of Michigan and Frederick
T. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey.149 Howard emphasized the language of
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment,150 which, Howard asserted.
“[p]lainly and in the clearest possible terms recognize[d] the right of each
State to regulate the suffrage and to impart or to declare the necessary
qualifications of voters.”151
Against this background, it soon became obvious that no suffrage bill
could gain the approval of Congress. Sumner’s proposal garnered only
nine votes in the Senate,152 while Boutwell’s bill was never even brought
to a vote in the House. Thus, any effort to require states to allow AfricanAmericans to vote would have to take the form of a constitutional
amendment. However, the precise form of the amendment to be proposed
was determined only after an intense debate among mainstream
Republicans over a variety of different options.
2. Initial Consideration by the House of Representatives
In the House of Representatives, it was the question of whether the
language of Boutwell’s initial proposal provided sufficiently expansive
protections that provoked the greatest discord among Republicans.
Republican Reps. Samuel Shellabarger and John A. Bingham of Ohio both
introduced proposals that were founded on the basic principle of universal
manhood suffrage.153 Both formulations would have generally required
states to allow adult males “of sound mind” access to the ballot but would
have allowed states to exclude those who had been convicted of serious
crimes. In addition, Shellabarger’s proposal would have allowed the states
to deny the ballot to those who had engaged in “insurrection or rebellion
against the United States.”154
Bingham, on the other hand, would have allowed the states to impose
a one year residency requirement, observing that “each year there are
landed upon our shores hundreds of thousands of adult persons who are
149. Id. at 979–80 (statement of Sen. Frederick Frelinghuysen), 1003
(statement of Sen. Jacob Howard).
150. Id. at 1003.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1041.
153. Id. at 638–39 (statement of Rep. Samuel Shellabarger), 638 (statement of
Rep. John Bingham).
154. Id. at 639.
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aliens [and] by the modern invention of forged naturalization papers
[allowing] the pollution of the ballot box by thousands who are not entitled
to vote, and yet control the elections of the people.”155 More importantly,
unlike Shellabarger’s proposal, Bingham’s formulation would not have
allowed the states to exclude men simply because they had participated in
the rebellion. Instead, essentially embracing the principles of universal
suffrage and universal amnesty, Bingham asserted that “[t]he interests of
this great country demand that we shall so frame the fundamental law of
the country that we will take not vengeance for the past, but security for
the future” and that “[w]e should so amend our Constitution as to summon
back to the standard of the country and to the support of its Government
the whole multitude of men who but yesterday were in arms against us.”156
Both proposals drew a variety of criticisms from other mainstream
Republicans. For example, Republican Rep. Benjamin F. Butler of
Massachusetts contended that the language of both proposals would call
into question the ability of the states to require that voters register prior to
casting ballots157 and indicated that he supported the imposition of
educational requirements as well.158 In addition, the idea of universal
amnesty that underlaid Bingham’s formulation drew the ire of
Republicans such as Rep. Glenn W. Scofield of Pennsylvania, who
characterized the concept as “an undeserved . . . act of grace to the cruel
men, who for four years drenched the land with blood, and whose
implacable hate still pursues the unforgiven Unionist [in the South] with
persecution, banishment, and murder.”159 Ultimately, Shellabarger’s
amendment was defeated on a vote of 126–61160 and Bingham was able to
garner only 24 votes in support of his proposal.161 After the defeat of these
alternatives, Boutwell’s original proposal was adopted by a vote of 150–
42.162
3. Initial Consideration by the Senate
The Senate began its work on a suffrage amendment even before the
House had completed the consideration of its version of the amendment.
In his speech introducing the proposal of the Senate Judiciary Committee
155.
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on January 28, William Stewart pressed for quick action. He noted that
“[e]very person in the country has discussed it; it has been discussed in
every local paper, by every local speaker; [and] it has been discussed at
the firesides.” 163 Thus, he declared, “I cannot add to the many eloquent
speeches that have [already] been made on this great question . . . I want a
vote . . . I hope we shall soon have a vote upon the question.”164
However, the liberal Senate rules left Stewart powerless to attain his
wish. The Judiciary Committee proposal was the subject of seemingly
endless discussions, including an all-night session on February 8, and a
wide variety of amendments were offered. For example, on January 29,
seeking to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex as well as
discrimination on the basis of race, Republican Sen. Samuel C. Pomeroy
of Kansas moved to amend Stewart’s proposal to provide that “the right of
citizens . . . to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged . . . for
any reasons not equally applicable to all citizens of the United States.”165
Asserting that “human nature, claiming its rights, has no sex” and that “the
mind and the soul have no gender,”166 Pomeroy insisted that “[t]here are
no reasons for giving the ballot to a man that do not apply to a woman with
equal force.”167
By making this proposal, Pomeroy raised an issue that divided
Republicans throughout the early Reconstruction era. Feminists and their
allies had been infuriated by the language of section two of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which reduced the representation of states that denied the
right to vote to certain classes of men but allowed states to exclude women
from voting rights without suffering any penalty.168 However, prior to
1869 the most complete congressional discussion of the issue of whether
women should be allowed to vote had taken place in December 1866, in
connection with the Senate’s consideration of the bill that was designed to
extend the right to vote to African-Americans in the District of Columbia.
163. Id. at 668.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 708.
166. Id. at 709.
167. Id. at 710. For other discussions of the debate over the issue of women’s
suffrage during the early Reconstruction era, see, e.g. FAY E. DUDDEN, FIGHTING
CHANCE: THE STRUGGLE OVER WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND BLACK SUFFRAGE IN
RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA (2011); ELLEN C. DU BOIS, FEMINISM AND
SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA 1848-1869, at 71–72 (1978); FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 48,
at 112–15 and sources cited therein.
168. Nina Morais, Sex Discrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment: Lost
History, 97 YALE L.J. 1153, 1155–57 (1988).
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In an effort to embarrass supporters of the bill, Sen. Edgar Cowan of
Pennsylvania—a nominal Republican who by late 1866 had become a
consistent supporter of the Democrats on race-related issues—proposed an
amendment that would have extended the right to vote to women in the
District.169 During the debate that followed, some mainstream Republican
senators, including Sens. Henry B. Anthony of Rhode Island, B. Gratz
Brown of Missouri, and Benjamin Wade of Ohio,170 expressed their
support for the Cowan amendment. Nonetheless, it soon became clear that
most Republicans opposed the amendment.
A number of Republicans argued that intrinsic differences between
men and women justified the policy of restricting the right to vote to men.
For example, observing that “the women of America are not called upon
to serve the Government as the men of America are,”171 Frederick T.
Frelinghuysen noted that “[t]hey do not bear the bayonet, and have not that
reason why they should be entitled to the ballot”172 and that “it seems to
me as if the God of our race has stamped upon them a milder, gentler
nature, which not only makes them shrink from, but disqualifies them for
the turmoil and battle of public life.”173 Similarly, Republican Sen. Lot
Morrill of Maine declared that the right to vote “associates the wife and
mother with policies of state, with public affairs, with making,
interpreting, and executing the laws, with police and war, and necessarily
disseverates [sic] her from purely domestic affairs, peculiar care for and
duties of the family; and, worst of all, assigns her duties revolting to her
nature and constitution, and wholly incompatible with those which spring
from womanhood.”174
Assertions such as these were often linked with appeals to what was
known as the theory of “virtual representation”—the idea that women had
no need for the right to vote because, unlike African-Americans, their
interests could be adequately represented by the men to whom they were
related. Thus, Frelinghuysen asserted that “the women of America vote by
faithful and true representatives, their husbands, their brothers, their sons;
and no true man will go to the polls and deposit his ballot without
remembering the true and loving constituency that he has at home.”175

169. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1866).
170. Id. at 55–56 (statement of Sen. Henry Anthony), 76–78 (statement of Sen.
B. Gratz Brown), 62–63 (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade).
171. Id. at 66.
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Other Republicans spoke frankly in terms of expediency in explaining
the reasons that they opposed the Cowan amendment. They worried that
attaching the amendment to the District of Columbia suffrage bill would
result in the defeat of the bill and that the opportunity to enfranchise the
African-American residents of the city would thereby be lost. The
statement of Republican Sen. Henry Wilson of Massachusetts reflected
this view. Wilson asserted, “I am for enfranchising the black man, and then
if [the women’s suffrage] question shall come up in due time and I have a
vote to give I shall be ready to give my vote for it.”176 But at the same time,
he also declared that “to vote [for women’s suffrage] now is to couple it
with the great measure now pressing upon us, to weaken that measure and
to endanger its immediate triumph, and therefore I shall vote against the
[Cowan] amendment.”177
Taken together, these considerations led most Republicans to oppose
the Cowan amendment. When the Senate took the final vote on December
12, 1866, it rejected the amendment by a vote of 37–9.178 Moreover, four
of those who supported the amendment were Democrats who no doubt
hoped to use the issue of sex discrimination to undermine the entire
suffrage bill. Thus, Senate Republicans overwhelmingly rejected the idea
that the party should commit itself to the principle of sex-blind suffrage.
Less than three years later, Pomeroy’s proposal also generated little
enthusiasm among his Republican colleagues. Although Pomeroy himself
attacked the theory of virtual representation,179 Republicans such as Sen.
Frederick A. Sawyer of South Carolina continued to insist that men could
be trusted to protect the interests of their wives and daughters.180
Conversely, Republican Sen. Willard Warner of Alabama took a position
similar to that which had underlain Henry Wilson’s opposition to the
Cowan amendment in 1866. While declaring that if the decision were his
alone he would grant women the right to vote, Warner also observed, “I
know that woman’s suffrage is not now attainable” and declared, “I would
not, as a practical legislator, jeopardize [African-American suffrage] by
linking with it that which is impossible.”181 Against this background, the
Senate never even put Pomeroy’s proposal to a vote.
Republicans were more closely divided over the question of whether
a constitutional amendment should prohibit racial discrimination generally
or should instead focus only on African-Americans, leaving the states free
176.
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to deny the right to vote to other racial and ethnic minorities. A number of
Republicans who took the latter position represented states from the far
west that were home to a substantial number of Chinese immigrants.
Although only white immigrants were eligible for naturalization at the
time that the constitutional amendment was being considered, these
senators expressed the fear that this aspect of the naturalization statute
might be changed at some later date and wished to guard against the
possibility that the states might then be required to enfranchise natives of
China who took advantage of the opportunity to become American citizens
in the future. For example, asserting that natives of China “bring with them
institutions of paganism which they are establishing here” and observing
that “in San Francisco they now have their places of worship in which
idols are set up,” Republican Sen. Henry W. Corbett of Oregon declared
that “the question is whether you desire to allow this class of people to
come in and overthrow the Christian institutions established on the Pacific
coast by the American people, a Christian people.”182
Those who shared Corbett’s sentiments proposed a number of
different formulations that were designed to achieve the objective of
leaving Asian immigrants outside the scope of the protection of any
constitutional amendment.183 However, the most important of the
proposals that were designed to limit the effect of the constitutional
amendment only to the situation faced by African-Americans was
engendered by an idiosyncratic concern that was expressed by Jacob
Howard. Howard does not seem to have been particularly concerned with
the possibility that natives of China might at some point be allowed to
vote. Instead, he repeatedly insisted that both the Boutwell and Stewart
formulations would, by negative implication, vest the federal and state
governments with the authority to impose religious qualifications for
voters. Seeking to eliminate this problem, he proposed an amendment that
would have provided that “citizens of the United States of African descent
shall have the same right to vote and hold office in States and Territories
as other citizens [who are] electors of the most numerous branch of their
respective Legislatures.”184 Voicing his support for Howard’s proposal,
Orrin Ferry declared that “when we propose to amend the Constitution we
should carry our actions just so far as the evil [to be addressed] extends
[and] the amendment [that Howard proposes] reaches to the full extent of

182. Id. at 1035.
183. E.g., id. (proposing to add language prohibiting naturalization of
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the evil, the wrong done to a certain class of citizens which is now
proposed to be remedied.”185
However, other Republicans decried the effort to limit protection to
African-Americans. Thus, Willard Warner asserted that “to single out one
race is unworthy of the country and unworthy of the great opportunity now
presented to us”186 and George Edmunds declared that “there is nothing
republican in [the Howard proposal].”187 Despite arguments such as these,
at one point Howard seems to have convinced a majority of his mainstream
Republican colleagues in the Senate that his proposal was superior to that
which the judiciary committee had produced. While on February 17 the
effort to substitute the Howard language failed on a vote of 27–22, the
margin of victory was provided by Democrats who were no doubt anxious
to keep the issue of the status of Chinese immigrants alive in any potential
dispute over ratification and voted unanimously to leave the committee
language intact.188
Other Republicans raised a very different objection to the language of
the Stewart proposal. Just as they had in the House, advocates of universal
manhood suffrage played a major role in the Senate discussions of the
proposed constitutional amendment. Willard Warner delivered a
particularly passionate plea in support of universal suffrage.189 Taking
direct aim at those who contended that the proposed constitutional
amendment would unduly infringe on state’s rights, Warner asserted that
“it is a proposition too clear for argument that to . . . the whole people [of]
the nation belongs the decision of the question [of] who shall exercise
political power”190 and that
to allow States to determine who of the citizens of the nation shall
have political power is to give away the most essential and vital
attribute of sovereignty—to concede a power which may be used
to build up an aristocracy or to change and destroy our system of
government.191
He also contended that
[the idea] that a citizen living in Massachusetts should lose his
right to vote for President by moving to Connecticut, or that
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
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different qualifications for voting for President, for instance,
should be required in different parts of the country, is . . .
manifestly wrong and . . . clearly at variance with [the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV].192
Warner also took issue with the narrowness of the Stewart proposal on
policy grounds. He observed that while the fundamental purpose of the
proposed constitutional amendment was to enfranchise AfricanAmericans, “without any violation of its letter or spirit, nine tenths of them
might be prevented from voting . . . by . . . an intelligence or property
qualification.”193 He also contended more generally that such
qualifications would effectively disenfranchise those who were most in
need of the ballot, observing that
“[t]he millionaire in his money, and the man of education in his
knowledge and brain, have each a power . . . greater than a
hundred ballots [while] [i]t is the poor, unlearned man, who has
nothing but the ballot, to whom it is a priceless heritage, a
protection and a shield.”194
In an effort to address these issues, Warner, like Bingham before him, put
forth a proposal that would have effectively provided for universal
suffrage and universal amnesty.195 However, when this formulation came
to a vote on February 9, it garnered the support of only five Republicans.196
By contrast, the universal suffrage amendment supported by Henry
Wilson gained far more traction in the Senate. In framing his proposal,
Wilson took a somewhat different tack than Bingham, Shellabarger, and
Warner. Rather than including sweeping language that abolished by its
terms virtually all limitations on access to the ballot, Wilson moved to
change the language of the proposed constitutional amendment to
specifically prohibit discrimination based on race, color, nativity,
property, education, or creed.197 In supporting this proposal, Republican
Sen. John Sherman of Ohio asked:
Why should we protect the African in the enjoyment of suffrage
when in certain States of the Union even naturalized citizens
cannot vote? Why should we protect the descendant of the African
192.
193.
194.
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196.
197.
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when in certain States of the Union a man who has the misfortune
not to be able to read and write cannot vote? Why should we apply
this supreme remedy of the Constitution only in favor of this
particular class of citizens? Senators must see at once that to rest
this constitutional amendment up on so narrow a ground is not
defensible.198
Responding to these arguments, the Republican opponents of the
Wilson formulation raised two different types of objections. First, some
suggested that an education requirement was in fact a desirable
prerequisite for the exercise of the franchise. Thus, in the view of Roscoe
Conkling of New York, such a stipulation would limit the right to vote to
those who possessed “a standard of intelligence above the most groveling
and besotted ignorance.”199 Others were concerned with the impact of the
Wilson proposal on states’ rights. For example, in sharp contrast to
Warner, Jacob Howard complained that the adoption of a universal
suffrage requirement would “overthrow and uproot the very foundations
of the State constitutions.”200
When the Wilson proposal first came to a vote on February 9, it failed
by a margin of 24–19.201 However, later that same day, the Senate reversed
itself and approved the proposal on a 31–27 vote.202 A number of senators
who had been absent for the first roll call ultimately voted to support the
Wilson proposal. Nonetheless, his language could not have been adopted
without the support of three Republican senators—Joseph C. Abbott of
North Carolina, Thomas Robertson of South Carolina, and Waitman T.
Willey of West Virginia—all of whom switched sides on the second vote.
Thus, the Senate became at least tentatively committed in principle to the
concept of universal suffrage for adult men.
However, before final Senate approval of the proposed constitutional
amendment, the addition of a provision that was designed to reform the
electoral college muddied the waters even further. This amendment was
the brainchild of Democratic Sen. Charles R. Buckalew of Pennsylvania,
who introduced the proposal on January 28. Buckalew’s ire was directed
at the prevalence of the so-called general ticket in presidential elections,
whereby the person receiving a majority of the popular vote in any state
would receive all of the electoral votes from that state. Buckalew
characterized the use of the general ticket as “unjust and unfair” and
198.
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200.
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argued that the use of that device rendered the electoral college “worse
than a sham [but rather] positively pernicious.”203
In 1842, Congress outlawed the use of the general ticket in elections
for the House of Representatives, requiring instead that individual
members of Congress be chosen by district.204 The difficulty was that
while Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution vests Congress with the
authority to prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for [the House],”205 Article II, Section 1 provides that electors shall be
chosen “in such Manner as the [state] Legislature [shall] direct.”206
Buckalew proposed to remedy this situation by requiring that electors be
chosen by a vote of the people qualified to vote in elections for the House
of Representatives and vesting Congress with the power to prescribe the
procedures to be used in the selection of the electors.
After some discussion, the Buckalew amendment was referred to the
Committee on Representative Reform, where it received unanimous
approval. On February 9, shortly after the Senate had adopted the Wilson
formulation, Oliver Morton moved to have the Buckalew initiative
appended to the proposed constitutional amendment.207 During the brief
debate that followed, Buckalew presciently emphasized the fact that the
regime then in place created the real possibility that a presidential
candidate might emerge victorious despite receiving fewer popular votes
than some other candidate—a possibility that would come to fruition in
the presidential elections of 1888, 2000, and 2016.208 Several senators also
noted that under the existing Constitution, states were not even required to
select electors by popular vote, and both Morton and Democrat Thomas
Hendricks noted that in South Carolina and Florida the state legislatures
had chosen electors in 1868.209
Against this background, the Senate initially rejected the
Buckalew/Morton proposal by a narrow margin.210 However, on a second
vote the electoral college reform measure was appended to the proposed

203. Id. at 671.
204. The evolution of the Apportionment Act of 1842 is described in detail in
Robert Ross, Recreating the House: The 1842 Apportionment Act and the Whig
Party’s Reconstruction of Representation, 49 POLITY 408 (2017).
205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
206. Id. art. II, § 1.
207. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1041 (1869).
208. E.g., id. at 1042 (statement of Sen. Oliver Morton), 1043 (statement of
Sen. George Edmunds).
209. Id. at 1042.
210. Id. at 1041.
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Fifteenth Amendment by a vote of 37–19211 and the decision to add the
proposal survived a motion to reconsider by a margin of 28–26.212 Almost
immediately thereafter, by a vote of 39–16, the combination of the Wilson
and Buckalew formulations was approved as a substitute for the
amendment that had been adopted by the House of Representatives and
this substitute was sent to the House for its consideration.213
4. Response of the House of Representatives
The House of Representatives discussed the Senate language on
February 15. John Bingham quickly moved to concur with the Senate and
send the proposal to the state legislatures for their consideration.214 George
Boutwell, however, argued that both portions of the Senate amendment
were fatally flawed. Boutwell contended that the Wilson formulation left
a giant loophole because it failed to explicitly prohibit discrimination
based on previous condition of servitude. Thus, he reasoned that the exConfederate states would remain free to disenfranchise virtually all free
African-Americans by simply denying the right to vote to all those who
had previously been enslaved.215 In addition, Boutwell observed that the
proposed reform of the electoral college system did not include a
requirement that the regulations adopted by Congress be uniform
throughout the nation, and that whatever party was in control of Congress
would therefore apparently be left free to manipulate the rules to their
advantage.216
After Boutwell voiced these objections, the House considered the
Wilson language separately from the Buckalew amendment. Although
Bingham vigorously disputed Boutwell’s assessment of the significance
of the failure to prohibit discrimination based on previous condition of
servitude,217 the mere possibility that Boutwell was correct was sufficient
to convince many supporters of universal manhood suffrage of the need
for a conference on this issue, and Bingham’s motion to concur in this part
of the Senate amendment garnered only 37 votes.218 Immediately
thereafter, the motion to concur in the electoral college reforms failed
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without even a roll call vote.219 Under these circumstances, the rules of the
House of Representative required that the House request a conference with
the Senate, and Speaker Schuyler Colfax designated Boutwell,
Shellabarger, and Democrat Charles Eldridge to represent the House on
the conference committee.220
5. Senate Action
When the notice of the House request reached the Senate on February
17, William Stewart immediately moved to have the Senate accede to the
request.221 However, after both George Williams and Charles Buckalew
contended that the issue was too important to refer to a conference
committee,222 Stewart withdrew this motion. Instead, mindful that the end
of the session was rapidly approaching and anxious to obtain the passage
of some form of suffrage amendment, Stewart sought to have the Senate
recede from its own proposal and concur in the measure that had originally
passed the House.223
Not surprisingly, Democrats and their allies were adamantly opposed
to this motion.224 But the main problem that Stewart faced was that some
mainstream Republicans were also dissatisfied with the formulation that
had passed the House. For these Republicans, the main problem did not lie
with the lack of a provision reforming the presidential selection process.
For example, Oliver Morton, who had championed the proposal that dealt
with this issue, declared, “I am not willing . . . to risk the adoption of a
constitutional amendment on the main question even by attaching to it [a
proposal] so good [as the Buckalew amendment].”225 Nor were most
Senate Republicans adamant about the need to provide for universal
manhood suffrage rather than simply outlawing discrimination based on
race. Thus, Henry Wilson regretfully observed, “My [proposal], I am sorry
to find, is too broad, comprehensive, and just to be sustained by the
country.”226
Instead, the main sticking point was the failure of the House language
to address the issue of racial discrimination in eligibility for office. This
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1226.
221. Id. at 1284.
222. Id. at 1284–85.
223. Id. at 1285.
224. See, e.g., id. at 1285–86 (statement of Sen. Charles Buckalew), 1299
(statement of Sen. Willard Saulsbury, Sr.).
225. Id. at 1292.
226. Id. at 1291.

2022]

THE COMING OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT

439

issue formed the backdrop of a bitter exchange between Wilson and
Stewart, with Wilson accusing Stewart of abandoning the AfricanAmericans who had been excluded from the state legislature in Georgia227
and Stewart responding that if Wilson himself had not insisted on
expanding the prohibitions embodied in the original Senate provision that
had dealt with officeholding, the latter provision would have had a much
better chance of passage in the House of Representatives.228 Stewart also
noted that “[s]ome of our leading Republican journals have objected to”
the idea of dealing with the right to hold office229 and asserted that “[t]he
only hope for getting anything is to vote for [the House] proposition.”230
In contrast, Frederick Sawyer declared, “I had rather have nothing than to
have this.”231
When the votes were counted, it became clear that Stewart had stepped
into a parliamentary trap of his own creation. In order for Stewart’s
maneuver to succeed, he would have had to prevail on two separate votes.
The first step was for the Senate to agree to abandon the proposal that had
passed that chamber on February 9. Approval of this proposal required
only a simple majority, and the motion carried by a margin of 33–24.232
But in addition to receding from its own version of the suffrage
amendment, the Senate was also required to affirmatively vote to adopt
the Boutwell language, and on this point a two-thirds majority was
necessary. Thus, while a majority of those voting supported Stewart on
this point, the motion failed on a vote of 31–27.233 As a result, Stewart’s
effort to break the legislative logjam brought the Senate back to square one
in the amendment process.
At this point, the senators began anew the consideration of Stewart’s
original language, which would have barred racial discrimination with
respect to both the right to vote and the right to hold office. As the Senate
remained in session for twelve consecutive hours, the tempers of the
exhausted senators became increasingly frayed. Republican Sen. James
W. Nye of Nevada summed up the mood of the entire body when he
exclaimed, “I am sick of hearing [this discussion]. It has become painful
to listen to it.”234 In a war of attrition, Stewart ultimately prevailed. After
the Senate considered and rejected a number of efforts to change the
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language of the amendment, on February 17 mainstream Republicans
united around the Stewart proposal and sent it back to the House on a 35–
11 vote.235
6. The House of Representatives Changes Course
When the amendment that the Senate had passed reached the House
floor, in parliamentary terms the proposal occupied a position that was
very different from that of the Wilson formulation that had arrived only
five days before. Rather than being styled as an amended version of
legislation that had already been passed by the House, the Stewart
amendment had the status of an entirely new proposal. Therefore, before
the House could even consider the idea of a conference committee, it was
required to approve either the Stewart amendment itself or some variation
thereof by a two-thirds vote. Against this background, Republican Rep.
Benjamin F. Butler of Massachusetts pleaded with his colleagues to adopt
the Senate proposal without change, observing that Senate rules would
allow renewed, extended debate over any alterations and declaring that “if
we do not take this I fear we shall get nothing.”236 However, a number of
his Republican colleagues were undeterred by this possibility and sought
to make changes in the proposed amendment before a final vote on passage
by the House.
Republican Rep. John A. Logan of Illinois moved to remove the
references to the right to hold office from the proposed constitutional
amendment. Drawing on principles of federalism, Logan argued that the
authority to determine which persons were qualified to make crucial
governmental decisions “has been properly left [to the states themselves]
by the Constitution.”237 He also contended that direct constitutional
protection for the right to hold office was unnecessary, arguing that once
African-Americans were granted the right to vote, they “will take care of
the right to hold office [for themselves].”238 But lurking beneath the
surface was also the fear of a political backlash against an amendment that
dealt with officeholding. To ask voters to give African-Americans the right
to vote was one thing, but explicitly suggesting to whites that they should
agree to be ruled by people of color was quite another.239 However, most
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Republicans in the House found these arguments unconvincing, and
Logan’s proposal was defeated on a 95–70 vote.240
In sharp contrast to Logan’s measure, both Samuel Shellabarger and
John Bingham once again sought to broaden the constitutional protections
established by the Stewart amendment. While Shellabarger reintroduced
the same universal suffrage proposal that he had advocated when the
House had first considered Boutwell’s formulation in early February,241
Bingham put forth language that in some ways resembled the Wilson
proposal that had originally passed the Senate. Bingham’s formulation
would have prohibited discrimination not only on the basis of race and
previous condition of servitude, but also nativity, property, and creed.242
However, unlike the original Wilson amendment, the Bingham proposal
made no mention of discrimination based on education.
Despite being opposed by a substantial number of mainstream
Republicans, Bingham’s alternative was adopted by the House on a vote
of 92–70.243 The margin of victory was provided by 20 Democrats who no
doubt supported the proposal in the hope that its adoption would
undermine the entire effort to have the 40th Congress pass a suffrage
amendment. Shellabarger then withdrew his universal suffrage
proposal.244 Nonetheless, when the House passed the amended version of
the suffrage measure on a vote of 140–37,245 the two houses of Congress
had, in the words of William Gillette, “performed a legislative
somersault.”246 The House of Representatives, rather than the Senate, was
now proposing the more radical version of the suffrage amendment.
7. The Approval of the Conference Committee Proposal
When the action of the House was reported to the Senate on February
22, Stewart did not repeat his earlier tactical error. He immediately moved
to convene a conference committee, and with little discussion the motion
carried by a vote of 32–17 over the objections of six Southern Republicans
who no doubt feared that a conference committee might delete the
protection for officeholding.247 Stewart, Roscoe Conkling, and George
Edmunds were then chosen to represent the Senate. The following day, the
240.
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House reciprocated by also approving a conference and appointing John
Bingham, George Boutwell, and John Logan to act on behalf of its
interests.248
The report that emerged from the conference committee confirmed the
worst fears of the Southern Republican senators. The conferees decided
not only to have the amendment focus solely on discrimination based on
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, but also to eliminate all
reference to officeholding from the text. The moving forces behind the
decision were apparently John Bingham and John Logan, both of whom
had opposed the officeholding provision in the House. During the
deliberations of the conference committee itself, Bingham and Logan were
able to persuade Stewart and Conkling to accept their position as well.249
According to George Edmunds, the choice to delete the provision was not
based on a philosophical objection to the idea of providing federal
protection for the right to hold office. Instead, a majority of the committee
members based their decision on a political calculation, believing that the
“people will not be satisfied to give the negro the right to run against
themselves for some office, but they are willing to confer upon him the
boon of voting for them.”250
Some Republicans, however, believed that these fears were
overblown. While on February 25 the House of Representatives passed the
conference committee measure without debate by a vote of 144–44,251 in
the Senate the situation was different. Led by Edmunds, who had refused
to sign the conference committee report, more radical Republicans
vigorously objected to the terms of the proposed amendment. For example,
Samuel Pomeroy assailed the actions of the committee as
“unparliamentary and almost unprecedented,”252 while a number of others
relied on the example of the situation in Georgia to refute any claim that
the right to vote would automatically carry with it the right to hold
office.253
However, such complaints failed to move most Senate Republicans.
Although a majority of Republicans favored the idea of protecting the right
to hold office in principle, they were willing to sacrifice this concept in
order to ensure the passage of a suffrage amendment. Some continued to
express the hope that once African-Americans were securely enfranchised,
248. Id. at 1495.
249. STEWART, supra note 126, at 236.
250. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1626 (1869).
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the officeholding problem would eventually take care of itself. Speaking
earlier, James Nye had given voice to this view in particularly colorful
language, stating:
Give me the majority of the ballots, and I will fix who shall hold
offices in a State. [African-Americans] will fix it; and they are
not . . . so stupid that they will not fix it in opposition, if need be,
to the Senators who represent them on this floor.”254
In the end, those who opposed the committee formulation were
helpless. With the session rapidly drawing to a close, it was clear that the
choice was between adopting the conference committee report and having
no constitutional amendment protecting African-American suffrage at all.
Henry Wilson summed up both the dilemma facing those who preferred
broader language and the conclusion ultimately reached by most
Republican senators, declaring:
“I have asked always for what was right and taken on all occasions
what I could get. I have acted upon the idea that one step taken in
the right direction made the next step easier to be taken. I
suppose . . . I must act upon that idea now.”255
Thus, when the Senate took the final vote on February 26, it passed the
conference committee proposal on a vote of 39–13. While a number of
more radical Republicans abstained, only one mainstream Republican—
John Pool of North Carolina—was sufficiently incensed to vote against
the acceptance of the committee report.256 Thus, after long and tortuous
consideration, Congress had finally approved a constitutional amendment
to send to the state legislatures for their consideration.
III. THE BATTLE OVER RATIFICATION
After the House of Representatives and the Senate approved the final
version of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Republican effort to obtain
ratification by the requisite three-quarters of the state legislatures began
almost immediately. During the campaign for ratification, Republicans
generally emphasized two points that had figured prominently in the
congressional debates. First, they contended that allowing AfricanAmericans to vote was a matter of simple justice, with one Republican
newspaper proclaiming that disenfranchisement of African-Americans
254. Id. at 1306; see also id. at 1625 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard).
255. Id. at 1626.
256. Id. at 1641.
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“cannot now be regarded . . . as anything less than monstrous
[symbolizing] a hideous system of caste, and making badges of servitude
where none should exist,”257 and another insisting that “[t]he experience
of the past is sufficient to convince all candid and impartial men that the
colored citizens will never be able to enjoy their civil rights as long as the
right to vote is denied them.”258 In addition, the supporters of ratification
argued that granting African-Americans the right to vote was “the surest
and speediest method of attaining general peace and tranquility and
freedom from the turmoil and anarchy which the suffrage question has
already provoked in many localities.”259
Opponents of ratification also relied on familiar arguments. Thus,
invoking the concept of federalism, Democratic Gov. John W. Stevenson
of Kentucky insisted that “[t]he question is not, what upon principles of
right, each state should adopt as the elements of suffrage, but whether the
Government is to be changed, and the states to be deprived practically of
their stateship,”260 while the Providence Journal asserted that “[i]f [the
amendment is ratified], it will only be an overthrow of state institutions
under the spurious guise of a constitutional amendment in favor of
freedom.”261 In addition, the Daily Intelligencer complained that, by
proposing the Fifteenth Amendment, Republicans were “[f]alsifying . . .
the pledge given at the Chicago Convention.”262
Against this background, the effort to have the amendment ratified
faced a variety of different challenges. First, while some leaders of the
257. The Constitutional Amendment, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE (Phila.), Oct. 5,
1869, at 2.
258. The Amendment in Kentucky, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, Mar. 19,
1869, at 2.
259. The Suffrage Constitutional Amendment, UNION & DAKOTAIAN
(Yankton, S.D.), Mar. 6, 1869, at 2; see also, e.g., Danger to the Amendment, N.
AM. & U.S. GAZETTE (Phila.), Sept. 10, 1869, at 2 (showing that adoption of
amendment would “suddenly and finally terminate all struggles about negroes,
and remove entirely from politics all the long continued excitement and agitations
with regard to them and their rights”).
260. Gov. Stevenson, of Kentucky, on the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment,
CHARLESTON COURIER, TRI-WEEKLY, Mar. 20, 1869, at 2.
261. The Fifteenth Amendment, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (Wash., D.C.),
Apr. 12, 1869, at 2.
262. Will General Grant Endorse the New Suffrage Amendment?, DAILY
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shamefully broken than the faith of the [Republican] party in proposing and
endeavoring to pass [the Fifteenth Amendment].”)

2022]

THE COMING OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT

445

women’s movement supported the Fifteenth Amendment, others opposed
ratification because the amendment left the states free to deny women the
right to vote. Thus, for example, Elizabeth Cady Stanton asserted that
“[m]anhood suffrage is national suicide and woman’s destruction”263 and
successfully persuaded the members of the National Woman’s Suffrage
Association to pass a resolution that declared, “[W]e repudiate the
Fifteenth Amendment, because by its passage in Congress, the Republican
party propose to substitute [for racial discrimination] an aristocracy of sex,
the most odious distinction in citizenship that has ever yet been proposed
since Governments had an existence.”264
In addition, particularly in the West, the issue of the impact of the
proposed amendment on the status of natives of China played an even
more prominent role than it had in the debate over the amendment in the
Senate. In the campaign leading up to the 1869 elections for state offices
in California, Democrats contended that the Fifteenth Amendment would
lead to the enfranchisement of Chinese immigrants, which in turn would
create a voting bloc controlled by the railroads and eventually lead to even
greater Chinese immigration.265 By contrast, noting that the amendment
did not bar discrimination on the basis of “nativity,” Sen. William Stewart
argued that, even if the amendment were ratified, states could bar Chinese
immigrants from voting on that basis.266 Supporters of the amendment also
observed that under existing naturalization laws Chinese immigrants could
not become citizens and could therefore be denied access to the ballot
regardless.267 Against this background, Stewart’s home state of Nevada
ratified the amendment, but the California state legislature
overwhelmingly voted against ratification and the Oregon legislature took
no action at all on the issue.268
The effort to ratify the amendment met strong resistance in other parts
of the nation as well. The intensity of the opposition to ratification was
clearly reflected in Indiana in March 1869, when a large majority of
Democratic state legislators resigned in order to leave both houses of the
state legislature without the quorums necessary for the Republican
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majorities to conduct ratification proceedings.269 In addition, in April
1869, the issue of ratification became directly entangled with the process
of reconstruction itself, as Congress considered a bill that dealt with the
reconstruction of Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas. Reacting to the actions
of the Democrats in his home state, Indiana Republican Sen. Oliver H.P.T.
Morton moved to add a requirement that each of the three states ratify the
Fifteenth Amendment as a precondition to having their representation in
Congress restored.270 As Morton noted, Congress had previously required
all of the ex-Confederate states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment in
order to regain their status as full partners in the Union.271 However, those
who opposed Morton’s motion argued that a requirement that the
designated states ratify the Fifteenth Amendment stood on a very different
footing.
First, while the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to
the entire nation, the amendment was quite clearly designed primarily to
address conditions in the ex-Confederate states themselves. By contrast,
all parties to the debate over the Fifteenth Amendment understood that a
ban on racial discrimination in voting rights would also have a significant
impact in a number of Northern states such as Indiana and Ohio, where
white voters had consistently rejected efforts to enfranchise the AfricanAmericans who formed a significant part of the population. Thus, for
example, Democratic Sen. Allan G. Thurman of Ohio complained that, by
coercing the named states into ratifying the Fifteenth Amendment, the
Morton proposal would in essence “force that . . . amendment . . . upon
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois as well, whatever may be the opinion of [those]
states.”272
In addition, some Republicans opposed the Morton proposal for other
reasons. While reaffirming their support for the Fifteenth Amendment in
principle, Republican Sens. Lyman Trumbull of Illinois and Roscoe
Conkling of New York argued that, since the Reconstruction Acts of 1867
and 1868 had established the conditions under which the ex-Confederate
states would be allowed to once again become full partners in the Union,
to add new conditions at this stage of the process would be unfair. Thus,
for example, Trumbull contended that to impose an additional requirement
would be “breaking faith on the part of the Government of the United
States with these people, who have been proceeding under our acts to do
those very things on the completion of which we have told them ‘You shall
269. The Democracy and the Suffrage Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
1869, at 4.
270. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 654 (1869).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 655.
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be restored to your relations with the Union.’”273 Similarly, Conkling
asserted that
as far as [ratification] is even by inadvertence associated with
unfair dealing, with a breach of faith, with an act which would be
deemed overreaching between man and man . . . so far as it is
associated with anything like that [ratification would be]
contaminated by a stigma and a distrust which ought not to rest
upon it.274
Objections such as these left Morton unmoved. Noting that the
affected states had not yet accepted the conditions imposed by the statutes
that had already been passed, he insisted that “[t]here is no faith to be
violated, no promise to be taken back” and that “[i]t is our right to propose
as many conditions as we see fit.”275 In addition, focusing on the actions
of the Democrats in Indiana, Morton asserted that “the Democratic party
desire[s] to keep [the issue of ratification] open as an element of political
success in the elections of 1870 and of 1872” and argued that
if we shall make the ratification of the [F]ifteenth [Amendment] a
condition of the reconstruction of [Virginia, Mississippi, and
Texas] these states will accept it at once . . . and then [the
amendment] will become a part of the Constitution [and] the
question will be taken out of our politics forever.276
A majority of Morton’s Republican colleagues apparently found
arguments such as these to be persuasive. Although thirteen Republicans
joined the united Democrats in opposition, on April 9, 1869, the
amendment to the reconstruction bill passed by a vote of 30–20.277 The
same day, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly voted to accept
the amendment as well.278 Later that year, with the prospects for
ratification in doubt and despite the opposition of a majority of the
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee,279 a similar requirement was
imposed on the state of Georgia.280
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Not surprisingly, those who opposed the Fifteenth Amendment
continued to insist that the imposition of these requirements unfairly
influenced the debate over ratification. For example, one Democratic
newspaper in Ohio complained that
[t]he Southern States are to be deprived of their rights under the
Constitution by the Radical majority in congress, unless they
adopt the negro suffrage amendment to the Federal Constitution,
and then they are to be allowed a representation in Congress, and
this is done to force negro suffrage on Ohio, Indiana and other
states, against the consent of the people.281
Similarly, Democratic Sen. John P. Stockton of New Jersey asserted that
Southern states “are to be coerced to a vote that alters the Constitution of
the United States and of New Jersey fundamentally” and declared that “the
question of who votes and who does not sinks into insignificance
compared with the fundamental alteration of our system of government
which is proposed, and the fraud and violence by which our home born
liberties are to be wrested from us.”282
Politicians in the states on which the conditions were imposed viewed
the situation quite differently. Because African-Americans had already
been enfranchised by virtue of the Reconstruction Acts in Virginia, Texas,
Mississippi, and Georgia, in those states the ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment would not materially alter the situation, and compliance with
the condition was relatively costless. Thus, as one Southern newspaper
observed, since “universal suffrage is a fixed fact . . . in the South, the
people of [the relevant states] are perfectly willing to do anything now to
force negro suffrage on the North and the West.”283 By the end of February
1870, each of those four states had approved the proposed constitutional
amendment, and the amendment had been ratified by a sufficient number
of states to become part of the Constitution.284

281. How Ohio Is To Be Made a Negro Voting State, NEWARK ADVOC. (Ohio),
Apr. 23, 1869, at 2.
282. Tammany Hall on the Next Presidency, N.Y. HERALD, July 7, 1869,
quoted in DAILY ARK. GAZETTE (Little Rock), July 14, 1869, at 3.
283. Political Affairs in Virginia, HINDS CNTY. GAZETTE (Raymond, Miss.),
May 12, 1869, at 2.
284. GILLETTE, supra note 8, at 84–85 tbl.2.
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CONCLUSION
The adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment brought with it the end of
the efforts of the Republican party to change the provisions of the
Constitution dealing with the institutions of government during the
Reconstruction era. The significance of these efforts can be evaluated from
a variety of different perspectives. Many Republicans would have
preferred an amendment that provided more sweeping protections for
voting rights. However, in terms of the structure of American federalism,
the adoption of even the simple prohibition on racial discrimination was
by any standard a watershed, which for the first time imposed an explicit
limitation on state authority to prescribe qualifications for participation in
both state and national elections. Thus, for example, although at the time
some feminists condemned Republicans for leaving the states free to
exclude women from voting, in later years supporters of women’s suffrage
were able to cite the Fifteenth Amendment as precedent in responding to
claims that the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment would be
inconsistent with the idea of federalism embodied in the Constitution.285
By contrast, an assessment of the substantive impact of the
amendment on the actual functioning of the political system depends
largely on the time frame on which one focuses. Together with sections
one and five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment
provided the constitutional predicate for the passage of a series of federal
statutes in the early 1870s that were designed to protect the rights of the
freed slaves.286 These statutes in turn provided the legal framework that
helped facilitate the election of African-Americans to both state and
federal office in the late 19th century.287 But as the enthusiasm of Northern
Republicans for the protection of African-American rights began to
recede, white Southerners regained control of the apparatus of their state
governments and increasingly began to adopt draconian measures
designed to prevent the freed slaves and their descendants from
participating in the political process.
While the withdrawal of federal troops from the South in the wake of
the disputed presidential election of 1876 is typically characterized as

285. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (relying on analogy to the
Fifteenth Amendment to reject challenge to the validity of the Nineteenth
Amendment).
286. The evolution of the enforcement acts is described in WANG, supra note
8, at 57–92.
287. The uneven history of enforcement of the statutes in the period between
1872 and 1891 is described in id. at 93–216.
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signaling the end of Reconstruction,288 African-Americans continued to
vote in substantial numbers in many parts of the South until considerably
later. Against this background, the dispute over the Federal Elections Bill
of 1890, which was known as the Lodge Force Bill, proved to be a crucial
turning point in the struggle over political power in the South. The Force
Bill—which was premised not on section two of the Fifteenth Amendment
itself, but rather on the authority over federal elections embodied in Article
I, Section 4—provided that, upon the request of a relatively small number
of citizens in any district, the local federal court would have been
authorized to appoint federal supervisors who would have been vested
with a variety of powers, including attending elections, inspecting
registration lists, verifying doubtful voter information, administering oaths
to challenged voters, stopping illegal aliens from voting, and certifying the
vote count. In addition, the bill would have empowered federal officials to
overturn the results of elections that state officials had certified.
The Force Bill was ultimately defeated after a fierce political struggle
in January 1891.289 But even the abortive effort to provide actual political
power to African-Americans in the South created great concern among the
members of the Southern white establishment. In response, beginning with
the adoption of the Mississippi constitution of 1890, the Southern state
governments adopted a variety of constitutional and statutory measures
that, although race-neutral on their face, were avowedly designed to limit
the access of non-whites to the ballot. In a number of states, these measures
had a dramatic impact. For example, while more than 130,000 AfricanAmericans were registered to vote in Louisiana in 1896, by 1900 that
number had dropped to a mere 5,320.290 Similarly, the state of Georgia
adopted draconian measures that had the effect of reducing the registration
of adult male African-Americans from 28.3% in 1904 to 4.3% in 1910.291
In short, during the early 20th century, despite the passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment, most of the ex-Confederate states effectively excluded
African-Americans from political power.
The first real harbinger of change came with the 1944 decision in
Smith v. Allwright292 where the Supreme Court relied on the Fifteenth
Amendment to strike down the use of the so-called “white primary” in the
state of Texas. However, the crucial breakthrough did not come until more
288. See C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE
OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (1977).
289. The complex maneuvering that led to the defeat of the Force Bill is
described in WANG, supra note 8, at 232–52.
290. Id. at 260.
291. Id.
292. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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than 20 years later when the enforcement clause of the amendment
provided the constitutional predicate for the passage of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, which not only outlawed racially discriminatory practices
generally but also required a number of Southern states to have all changes
in voting procedures precleared by the federal government before the
changes could take effect.293
The passage and implementation of the Voting Rights Act has had a
profound effect on the ability of African-Americans to participate in the
election of public officials, particularly in the Southern states.294
Nonetheless, discrimination against minority races continues to be a
problem in this context.295 The Fifteenth Amendment reminds us of the
need to be constantly vigilant in order to ensure that state laws that regulate
the political process treat members of all races equally.

293. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
294. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 547 (2013) (showing that
minority turnout in states subject to preclearance requirement has greatly
increased since the passage of the Voting Rights Act).
295. See id.

